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IS THERE A ROLE FOR COMMON CARRIAGE 
IN AN INTERNET-BASED WORLD? 
Christopher S. Yoo∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 During the course of the network neutrality debate, 
advocates have proposed extending common carriage regulation 
to broadband Internet access services. Others have endorsed 
extending common carriage to a wide range of other Internet-
based services, including search engines, cloud computing, Apple 
devices, online maps, and social networks. All too often, however, 
those who focus exclusively on the Internet era pay too little 
attention to the lessons of the legacy of regulated industries, 
which has long struggled to develop a coherent rationale for 
determining which industries should be subject to common 
carriage. Of the four rationales for determining the scope of 
common carriage—whether industry players (1) hold themselves 
out as serving all comers, (2) are “affected with a public interest,” 
(3) are natural monopolies, or (4) offer transparent transmission 
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Competition, University of Pennsylvania. This paper benefited from presentations at the 
Conference on “The End of the Phone System” cosponsored by the Institute for 
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capability between points of the customers choosing without 
change—each has been discredited or is inapplicable to Internet-
based technologies. 
Moreover, common carriage has long proven difficult to 
implement. Nondiscrimination is difficult to enforce when 
products vary in terms of quality or cost and forecloses demand-
side price discrimination schemes (such as Ramsey pricing) that 
can increase economic welfare. In addition, the academic 
literature has long noted that the obligation to keep rates 
reasonable is difficult to apply, has trouble accommodating 
differences in quality, provides weak incentives to economize, 
creates systematic biases toward inefficient solutions, raises 
difficult questions about how to allocate common costs, deters 
innovation, and requires collusion by creating entry barriers, 
standardizing products, pooling information, providing advance 
notice of any pricing changes, and allowing the government to 
serve as the cartel enforcer. Three historical examples—early 
local telephone companies known as competitive access 
providers, the detariffing of business services, and Voice over 
Internet Protocol—provide concrete illustrations of how 
refraining from imposing common carriage regulation can benefit 
consumers. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Without question, the Internet represents the most 
important development in the communications sector over the 
past quarter century. Many early scholars optimistically 
endorsed what has become known as “Internet exceptionalism” 
and argued that the past no longer served as a useful starting 
point for legal analysis.1 Interestingly, in recent years, 
                                                     
 1. See generally Tim Wu, Is Internet Exceptionalism Dead?, in THE NEXT DIGITAL 
DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 179 (Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus 
eds., 2010) (reviewing the history of Internet exceptionalism); Eric Goldman, The Third 
Wave of Internet Exceptionalism, INFORMIT (Feb. 23, 2009), http://www.informit.com/ 
articles/article.aspx?p=1325266 (defining Internet exceptionalism and describing its 
development). For the leading early scholarly statement expounding what is now known 
as “Internet exceptionalism,” see David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The 
Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1387–91 (1996). For a somewhat 
polemical exposition of this position, see John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the 
Independence of Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), 
http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html. 
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commentators have increasingly turned to one of the most 
traditional forms of regulation: common carriage. 
The debate over network neutrality that has dominated 
Internet policy for the past decade provides the most salient 
example. The embrace of common carriage came about slowly: 
when some early critics equated network neutrality with common 
carriage,2 many network neutrality proponents appeared 
reluctant to equate the two regimes.3 The D.C. Circuit’s decision 
holding that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
lacked the jurisdiction to sanction Comcast for blocking peer-to-
peer file-sharing4 prompted a sea change in this regard, with 
many network neutrality proponents now embracing common 
carriage.5 The FCC explored moving in this direction. Despite 
                                                     
 2. See Bruce M. Owen, Antecedents to Net Neutrality, REGULATION, Fall 2007, at 
14, 14 (“[T]he architects of the concept of net neutrality . . . . have simply resurrected the 
traditional but uncommonly naïve ‘common carrier’ solution to the threats they fear.”); 
Christian Sandvig, Network Neutrality Is the New Common Carriage, 9 INFO: J. POL’Y, 
REG. & STRATEGY FOR TELECOMM., INFO. & MEDIA, no. 2/3, 2007, at 136, 143–44 (“The 
parallel between common carrier regulation and the network neutrality is a fairly obvious 
one.”) Randolph J. May, The “Common Carrier” Free Press, FREE STATE FOUND. (Apr. 27, 
2009), http://freestatefoundation.blogspot.com/2009/04/common-carrier-free-press.html 
(“[A]ll net neutrality-like mandates . . . in effect constitute common carrier-like 
regulation . . . .”). 
 3. See, e.g., Tim Wu, Why Have a Telecommunications Law? Anti-Discrimination 
Norms in Communications, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 15, 16–17, 32–35 (2006) 
(noting the heavy criticism of common carriage and proposing the substitution of a simple 
antidiscrimination rule); Part 2: Uses for Devices of Multiple Capabilities Cannot Always 
Be Predicted or Channeled, COOK REP. ON INTERNET PROTOCOL, TECH., ECON., & POL’Y 
(Cook Network Consultants, Ewing, N.J.), Jan.–Feb. 2006, at 71, 91–92, available at 
http://cookreport.com/newsletter-sp-542240406/pdf?download=61:pdf; Hance Haney, Eric 
Schmidt and Laurence Tribe on Common Carriage and Net Neutrality Regulation, TECH. 
LIBERATION FRONT (Aug. 24, 2007), http://techliberation.com/2007/08/24/eric-schmidt-and-
laurence-tribe-on-common-carriage-and-net-neutrality-regulation/ (quoting Google 
Chairman and CEO Eric Schmidt during a discussion of network neutrality as stating 
that “common carriage . . . is a mistake” and expressing hope that any common carrier 
obligations would be applied “pretty narrowly” (internal quotation marks omitted)); John 
Windhausen, Jr., Good Fences Make Bad Broadband: Preserving an Open Internet 
Through Net Neutrality, PUB. KNOWLEDGE 38 (Feb. 6, 2006), http://www.publicknowledge. 
org/pdf/pk-net-neutrality-whitep-20060206.pdf. 
 4. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 644, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 5. See, e.g., TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION 
EMPIRES 311–12 (2010) (arguing that net neutrality “is essentially the application of the 
idea of common carriage to a twenty-first-century industry”); Susan P. Crawford, 
Transporting Communications, 89 B.U. L. REV. 871, 910–12, 919 (2009) (discussing 
Comcast and suggesting that “[t]he time is ripe for a re-statement of and re-commitment 
to . . . common carriage”); Sascha D. Meinrath & Victor W. Pickard, Transcending Net 
Neutrality: Ten Steps Toward an Open Internet, 12 J. INTERNET L. 1, 14, 18 (2008) (noting 
that Comcast best exemplifies “the potential for abusing net neutrality” and 
recommending common carriage); Nate Anderson, Making ISPs Common Carriers: Just a 
Simple “Error Correction”, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 19, 2010), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2010/04/making-isps-common-carriers-just-a-simple-error-correction/ (quoting 
Susan Crawford and Tim Wu). 
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having ruled on six separate occasions that last-mile broadband 
services were not telecommunications services subject to common 
carriage obligations,6 the FCC floated a proposal in May 2010 that 
would have reversed course.7 The FCC’s December 2010 Open 
Internet Order ultimately declined to follow this path,8 although a 
proceeding that would reclassify broadband Internet access to bring 
it within the common carriage regime remains open.9 
More recently, regulatory authorities have begun to consider 
whether to extend common carriage to services beyond broadband 
Internet access. Consider, for example, Voice over Internet Protocol 
(“VoIP”), which is an over-the-top application that rides on the 
infrastructure provided by traditional telephone and cable 
companies. The FCC has long ruled that non-interconnected VoIP 
services—those that cannot receive calls originating on the 
traditional telephone network—are not subject to common carriage 
regulation under Title II of the Communications Act of 1934.10 The 
                                                     
 6. See Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet 
over Wireless Networks, Declaratory Ruling, 22 FCC Rcd. 5901, 5909–11 ¶¶ 19–28 (2007) 
(“[W]e find that wireless broadband Internet access service is similarly an ‘information 
service.’”); United Power Line Council’s Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding the 
Classification of Broadband over Power Line Internet Access Service as an Information 
Service, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 FCC Rcd. 13281, 13285–87 ¶¶ 8–10 (2006) 
(categorizing BPL’s services as information services); Appropriate Framework for 
Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd. 14853, 14862–65 ¶¶ 12–14, 14909–12 ¶¶ 102–107 
(2005) (categorizing the services provided as information services, not telecommunication 
services); Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other 
Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 
4820–23 ¶¶ 34, 38 (2002) (finding “that cable modem service . . . is an information service” 
and not a telecommunications service), aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. 
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 996–1000, 1003 (2005); Appropriate Framework 
for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd. 3019, 3029–34 ¶¶ 17–27 (2002) (“[W]ireline broadband 
Internet access service is an information service . . . .”); Federal-State Joint Board on 
Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd. 11501, 11520–26 ¶¶ 39–43, 
11536–40 ¶¶ 73–81 (1998) (“We find that Internet access services are appropriately 
classed as information, rather than telecommunications, services.”). 
 7. JULIUS GENACHOWSKI, THE THIRD WAY: A NARROWLY TAILORED BROADBAND 
FRAMEWORK 3–5 (2010), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/ 
attachmatch/DOC-297944A1.pdf; AUSTIN SCHLICK, A THIRD-WAY LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
FOR ADDRESSING THE COMCAST DILEMMA 2–5 (2010), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-297945A1.pdf. 
 8. Preserving the Open Internet, Report and Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, 17950–
51 ¶ 79 (2010) (rejecting characterization of last-mile broadband providers as common 
carriers); see also id. at 18046 (Copps, Comm’r, concurring) (criticizing the FCC’s refusal 
to bring last-mile broadband providers within the common carriage regime governing 
telecommunications services). 
 9. See Framework for Broadband Internet Service, Notice of Inquiry, 25 FCC Rcd. 
7866, 7866–67 ¶ 1 (2010); id. at 7919–20 (statement of Copps, Comm’r). 
 10. Petition for Declaratory Ruling That Pulver.com’s Free World Dialup Is Neither 
Telecommunications Nor a Telecommunications Service, Memorandum Opinion and 
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French government has adopted a different stance, demanding that 
Skype register as a traditional telecommunications provider 
(presumably subject to common carriage regulation) and referring 
Skype to the Paris public prosecutor for its refusal to do so.11 
Others have proposed invoking common carriage regulation to 
govern the terms under which the networks comprising the Internet 
interconnect with one another.12 Most notably, the European 
Telecommunications Network Operators’ Association (“ETNO”) 
submitted a proposal during the International Telecommunications 
Union’s December 2012 World Conference on International 
Telecommunications that would extend the regime governing the 
settlement of international telephone calls to the Internet.13 Others 
scholars have proposed extending common carriage regulation to 
other services, including search engines,14 cloud computing,15 
                                                     
Order, 19 FCC Rcd. 3307, 3309–10 ¶ 5, 3312–14 ¶¶ 9–12 (2004). For the formal definition 
of “interconnected VoIP services,” see IP-Enable Services, First Report and Order and 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd. 10245, 10256–58 ¶¶ 23–24 (2005). 
 11. David Jolly, French Regulators Seek Inquiry into Skype, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 
2013, at B7. 
 12. James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 
FED. COMM. L.J. 225, 275 (2002). For a more skeptical assessment, see Philip J. 
Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 529, 548–50 (2009). 
 13. ETNO Paper on Contribution to WCIT: ITRs Proposal to Address New 
Internet Ecosystem, EUROPEAN TELECOMM. NETWORK OPERATORS’ ASS’N 7, 9 (Sept. 7, 
2012), http://www.etno.eu/datas/itu-matters/etno-ip-interconnection.pdf (proposing 
an amendment that would (1) extend the ITU regulations governing international 
interconnection to include the Internet and (2) specify that interconnection 
agreements should, “where appropriate, respect[] the principle of sending party 
network pays”). Interestingly, the sole scholarly authority ETNO cites in support of 
its position is my recent book. Id. at 5 & n.2, 6 (citing CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE 
DYNAMIC INTERNET: HOW TECHNOLOGY, USERS, AND BUSINESSES ARE TRANSFORMING 
THE NETWORK 105–06 (2012)). I pointed out to ETNO that this represented a 
miscitation of my work. Although ETNO cites a passage of my book illustrating 
circumstances under which sending party network pays would be the appropriate 
framework, that passage was immediately followed by examples when the contrary 
principle ought to obtain. See YOO, supra, at 106–07. Instead of supporting regulation 
of IP interconnection, my book advocates preserving and encouraging pricing 
flexibility by refusing to regulate interconnection. Id. at 107–08. ETNO 
representatives responded that the proposal cited my work only in the introductory 
section establishing that the economic and technological environment surrounding 
the Internet is changing and recognized that my book does not support its call for 
extending ITU regulations to IP interconnection. This is technically true, although I 
remain concerned that casual readers might nonetheless mistakenly regard their 
citation of my work as an endorsement of their position. 
 14. Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, 
Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1206, 
1208–09 (2008); Andrew Odlyzko, Network Neutrality, Search Neutrality, and the 
Never-Ending Conflict Between Efficiency and Fairness in Markets, 8 REV. NETWORK 
ECON. 40, 48, 52–53 (2009). For contrary views, see Mark A. Jamison, Should Google Be 
Regulated as a Public Utility?, 9 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 223, 235–36, 245–46 (2013); and 
Marina Lao, Search, Essential Facilities, and the Antitrust Duty to Deal, 11 NW. J. TECH. 
& INTELL. PROP. 275, 290 (2013). 
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Apple devices,16 online maps,17 and social networks such as 
Facebook.18 
The move is somewhat surprising and backward looking. What 
is even more striking is that the proposals advocating common 
carriage regulation for the Internet exhibit so little awareness of 
common carriage’s regulatory history. Far from being a tried and 
true regulatory solution, the government has long recognized that 
common carriage is susceptible to a wide range of inefficiencies, 
structural biases, and manipulation.19 Common carriage has also 
been the subject of a wide range of scholarly criticism as well.20 
                                                     
 15. Kevin Werbach, The Network Utility, 60 DUKE L.J. 1761, 1821–23 (2011). 
Although early commentators often referred to early versions of the cloud as a “computer 
utility” or a “network utility,” they were careful to note that these services were too 
competitive and specialized to be regarded as public utilities. See C.C. BARNETT, JR., 
ET AL., THE FUTURE OF THE COMPUTER UTILITY 85–94 (1967); D.F. PARKHILL, THE 
CHALLENGE OF THE COMPUTER UTILITY 150 (1966); Manley R. Irwin, The Computer 
Utility, DATAMATION, Nov. 1966, at 22, 25–27; Delbert D. Smith, The Interdependence 
of Computer and Communications Services and Facilities: A Question of Federal 
Regulation, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 829, 853–59 (1969); Paul Baran, Communication 
Policy Issues for the Coming Computer Utility 2, 5–6, 9–12, 21–22 (RAND Paper 
Series No. P-3685, 1968). 
 16. See Bill Davidow, Is Apple a Common Carrier?, FORBES (Apr. 20, 2011), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/billdavidow/2011/04/20/is-apple-a-common-carrier/ 
(arguing in favor of updating the concept of common carriage to encompass 
companies such as Apple). 
 17. See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP 
IT 184–85 (2008). 
 18. See id. at 184 (referencing Facebook in the context of network neutrality 
principles); see also Danah Boyd, Facebook Is a Utility; Utilities Get Regulated, 
APOPHENIA (May 15, 2010), http://www.zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/2010/05/15/ 
facebook-is-a-utility-utilities-get-regulated.html; Zeynep Tufekci, Google Buzz: The 
Corporatization of Social Commons, TECHNOSOCIOLOGY (Feb. 17, 2010), 
http://technosociology.org/?p=102. For a contrary view, see Adam Thierer, The Perils 
of Classifying Social Media Platforms as Public Utilities 51 (Mercatus Ctr., George 
Mason Univ., Working Paper No. 12-11, 2012), available at 
http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/PerilsClassifyingSocialMediaPublicUtilities.pdf 
 19. See, e.g., NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NTIA 
REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES REPORT 13–31 (1987), available at http://www.its.bldrdoc. 
gov/publications/87-222.aspx; John Haring & Evan Kwerel, Competition Policy in the 
Post-Equal Access Market 5–11 (FCC Office of Plans & Pol’y, Working Paper, 1987), 
available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp22.pdf. See generally 
Scott M. Schoenwald, Regulating Competition in the Interexchange Telecommunications 
Market: The Dominant/Nondominant Carrier Approach and the Evolution of 
Forbearance, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 367, 414–16 (1997) (providing a brief overview of these 
criticisms). 
 20. For textbook discussions of the problems associated with the regulatory 
tools used to implement common carriage, see, e.g., DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY 
M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 672–78 (3d ed. 2000); JEFFREY 
CHURCH & ROGER WARE, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: A STRATEGIC APPROACH 
§ 26.2.2, at 847–52 (2000); 1 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: 
PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 27–32 (1970) [hereinafter 1 KAHN]. See generally 2 
ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 
11–59, 93–94, 108–12, 325–27 (1971) [hereinafter 2 KAHN]; W. KIP VISCUSI, JOSEPH 
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Indeed, the FCC has been attempting to reform common carriage 
regulation since 1979.21 
Any assessment for applying common carriage principles to 
the Internet must come to grips with this legacy. This Article 
seeks to fill this void. Part II reviews the definitions of common 
carriers and analyzes the extent to which common carriage 
applies to Internet-based services under current law. Part III 
examines the policy considerations disfavoring common carriage 
identified in the literature, focusing on the difficulties in 
enforcing nondiscrimination and in regulating rates as well as 
the danger that common carriage might facilitate collusion. Part 
IV reviews the lessons of three examples where portions of the 
industry abandoned common carriage regulation. A brief 
conclusion follows. 
II. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO COMMON CARRIAGE REGULATION 
Before one can analyze the relative merits of common 
carriage regulation, one must understand what it is and what it 
entails. Subpart A reviews the various definitions of common 
carriage that have been put forth over the years. Subpart B 
discusses the duties that follow from being classified as a 
common carrier. 
A. The Definition of Common Carriage 
The Communications Act of 1934 defines “common carrier” 
as “any person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in 
interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio or 
interstate or foreign radio transmission of energy.”22 The 
circular nature of this definition inevitably leads those seeking 
to determine what a common carrier is to look to other sources. 
Interestingly, a number of recent scholars have reviewed the 
historical justifications of common carriage only to conclude 
(against their interests) that they fail to yield a coherent 
rationale.23 
                                                     
E. HARRINGTON, JR. & JOHN M. VERNON, ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 
431–36, 560–71 (4th ed. 2005). 
 21. See Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Carrier Services and 
Facilities Authorizations Therefor, Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, 77 
F.C.C.2d 308, 309–10 ¶¶ 1–3 (1979). See generally Schoenwald, supra note 19, at 
375–83 (reviewing the regulatory history). 
 22. 47 U.S.C. § 153(11) (2012). This definition is subject to statutory exceptions 
and excludes radio broadcasting. Id. 
 23. See Kevin Werbach, Only Connect, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 1247 
(2007) (“Common law sources are also unhelpful, offering competing and largely 
inconsistent rationales.”); Thomas B. Nachbar, The Public Network, 17 COMMLAW 
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1. Holding Out. The leading case in defining common 
carriage comes from the D.C. Circuit’s 1976 decision in National 
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FCC (NARUC 
I), which held that a common carrier is a firm that “undertakes 
to carry . . . all people indifferently” and “hold[s] oneself out 
indiscriminately to the clientele one is suited to serve.”24 The 
court made clear that “business may be turned away either 
because it is not of the type normally accepted or because the 
carrier’s capacity has been exhausted.”25 The key is that the 
provider does not make “individualized decisions, in particular 
cases, whether and on what terms to deal.”26 
Requiring companies that assert a willingness to serve all 
customers to honor that commitment is uncontroversial and 
quite sensible. In effect, it sounds in contract and simply requires 
that providers stand behind their promises.27 It is subject to a 
number of objections, however. Critics point out that it both lacks 
a historical pedigree and fails to explain why certain industries 
are subject to common carriage and why some are not.28 
More problematically, any definition that allows a firm’s 
description of the services it offers to determine whether it is a 
common carrier will inevitably be subject to manipulation. A 
provider could avoid common carriage obligations simply by 
limiting its offers to a subset of the overall customer base instead 
of making them available to the public at large.29 The result 
would place control over whether a firm is a common carrier 
under the control and discretion of the firm potentially subject to 
regulation.30 Few firms voluntarily subject themselves to such 
                                                     
CONSPECTUS 67, 109 (2008) (“It is hard to find a specific characteristic that leads to 
nondiscriminatory access and rate regulation.”). 
 24. Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC (NARUC I), 525 F.2d 630, 641 
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 27. Nachbar, supra note 23, at 86–87. Some have tied this contractual aspect to the 
law of bailments, which placed a fiduciary responsibility on entities holding themselves 
out as general carriers of particular types of goods. William Jones, The Common Carrier 
Concept as Applied to Telecommunications: A Historical Perspective 9–10 (1980), available 
at http://www.cybertelecom.org/notes/jones.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2013); see also 
Crawford, supra note 5, at 878 (citing Jones, supra, at 9–10); Richard S. Whitt, Evolving 
Broadband Policy: Taking Adaptive Stances to Foster Optimal Internet Platforms, 17 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 417, 494–95 (2009). 
 28. See Daniel A. Lyons, Net Neutrality and Nondiscrimination Norms in 
Telecommunications, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 1029, 1043–44 (2012); Nachbar, supra note 23, at 
88–93. 
 29. See NARUC I, 525 F.2d at 642. 
 30. See James H. Lister, The Rights of Common Carriers and the Decision Whether 
to Be a Common Carrier or a Non-Regulated Communications Provider, 53 FED. COMM. 
L.J. 91, 93, 96 (2000) (“The definitions of ‘common carrier’ . . . are flexible enough to give 
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regulation.31 Although the FCC did not stop AT&T from evading 
common carriage restrictions by filing a tariff applicable to a 
single customer, that decision did not withstand judicial 
review.32 
The only viable alternative is to base the holding out 
rationale on some foundation other than the regulated firm’s 
assent. To do so, however, would create a deep internal 
contradiction: the fact that holding out is rooted in contract 
means that it derives its normative force from the fact that the 
provider has acceded to certain terms of service.33 But the 
imposition of mandatory carriage obligations simultaneously 
overrides that assent.34 It is for this reason that commentators 
have criticized holding out as “a conspicuously empty” 
justification for imposing common carriage obligations.35 
2. “Affected with a Public Interest.” Others calling for 
imposing common carriage on IP-based communications invoke 
the hoary bromide that such regulation is justified for 
industries “affected with the public interest.”36 Interestingly, 
most of these references fail to acknowledge that they are 
invoking a Lochner-era doctrine that is almost universally 
regarded as discredited.37 
                                                     
providers discretion in structuring many communications services as either common 
carrier or non-common carrier services.”). 
 31. As the Supreme Court observed regarding the firms subject to regulation in 
Munn v. Illinois, “obviously Munn and Scott had not voluntarily dedicated their business 
to a public use. They intended only to conduct it as private citizens, and they insisted that 
they had done nothing which gave the public an interest in their transactions or conferred 
any right of regulation.” Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 533–34 (1934). 
 32. AT&T Communications, Revisions to Tariff F.C.C. No. 12, 4 FCC Rcd. 4932, 
4938 ¶ 57 (1989), rev’d and remanded sub nom. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 917 F.2d 
30, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1990). See generally PETER W. HUBER, MICHAEL K. KELLOGG & JOHN 
THORNE, FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW § 9.5.3.1, at 9-77 to -78 (2d ed. Supp. 
2013). 
 33. See Nachbar, supra note 23, at 92. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 93. 
 36. See BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED 
RESOURCES 103, 218 (2012); Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 14, at 1208–09; Nachbar, 
supra note 23, at 79–84 (exploring the “businesses affected with the public interest” 
rationale as a potential justification for imposing nondiscriminatory access); Speta, supra 
note 12, at 277–78; Whitt, supra note 27, at 491–92; Wu, supra note 3, at 17 (“The oldest 
and hardest question in the field of common carriage is what exactly constitutes a 
‘business affected with a public interest.’ On today’s networks, that usually means 
distinguishing private from public information networks.” (footnote omitted)). 
 37. DANIEL F. SPULBER & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, NETWORKS IN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: ECONOMICS AND LAW 395–96 (2009); Peter Decherney, Nathan 
Ensmenger & Christopher S. Yoo, Are Those Who Ignore History Doomed to Repeat It?, 78 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1627, 1678–79 (2011) (reviewing WU, supra note 5). 
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This principle, which was first developed in England,38 
received its most famous articulation in the landmark case of 
Munn v. Illinois.39 Munn arose during the era when the Supreme 
Court regularly held that a wide range of economic regulation 
represented an unconstitutional infringement of an individual’s 
substantive due process right to the freedom of contract.40 The 
desire to uphold imposing rate regulation on railroads led Munn 
to recognize an exception to this right for industries “affected 
with a public interest,” which included ferries, wharves, 
warehouses, taverns, inns, mills, bridges, turnpike roads, and 
common carriers.41 
As an initial matter, one must bear in mind that Munn was 
a constitutional decision that determined when permitting an 
infringement on individuals’ economic rights was permissible.42 
Holding that the government has the power to take a particular 
action says nothing about whether doing so would be desirable as 
a matter of regulatory policy. 
In addition, the coherence of this doctrine came under 
immediate conceptual attack by liberals and conservatives 
alike.43 Justice Field’s dissent cogently pointed out that the public 
has an interest in industries as diverse as housing, textile 
manufacturing, the construction of machinery, and the printing 
of books.44 Courts rejected arguments that the fact that a firm 
obtained property through eminent domain45 or was operating 
under a state franchise46 was by itself sufficient to render an 
industry “affected with the public interest.”47 Instead, the inquiry 
was governed by a multifactor balancing test, with no one factor 
being dispositive.48 Later courts held that the test encompassed 
                                                     
 38. See MATTHEW HALE, DE PORTIBUS MARIS, reprinted in A COLLECTION OF 
TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND, FROM MANUSCRIPTS 72, 78 (Francis Hargrave 
ed., 1787) (c. 1670). 
 39. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125–26 (1876). 
 40. Howard J. Vogel, The “Ordered Liberty” of Substantive Due Process and the 
Future of Constitutional Law as a Rhetorical Art: Variations on a Theme from Justice 
Cardozo in the United States Supreme Court, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1473, 1482, 1485 n.68 
(2007). 
 41. Munn, 94 U.S. at 126–30. 
 42. Id. at 125–26, 130. 
 43. See Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons from the 
Controversy over Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187, 200–07 (1984) 
(surveying the critiques). 
 44. Munn, 94 U.S. at 140–41 (Field, J., dissenting). 
 45. FORD P. HALL, THE CONCEPT OF A BUSINESS AFFECTED WITH A PUBLIC INTEREST 
96–97 (1940). 
 46. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 534 (1934). 
 47. Id.; HALL, supra note 45, at 96–97. 
 48. HALL, supra note 45, at 17–55, 90–145. 
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such industries as banking,49 fire insurance,50 and even the 
wholesale marketing of ice.51 Chief Justice Taft’s valiant attempt 
to distill the inquiry into a workable test52 is recognized even by 
proponents of the test to have failed.53 The absence of clear 
guidance allowed judges to impose their own preferences over 
which industries were subject to rate regulation.54 
The Supreme Court soon agreed, recognizing in Nebbia v. 
New York that “there is no closed class or category of businesses 
affected with a public interest.”55 After Nebbia, the Court 
regarded the doctrine as “discarded,”56 and “the 
doctrine . . . disappeared from constitutional jurisprudence.”57 
Similarly, in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., the Supreme 
Court rejected claims that industries “affected with a public 
interest,” such as electrical utilities, were state actors, citing as 
its principal authority Nebbia’s language, concluding that 
“affected with a public interest” was “not susceptible of definition 
and form[ed] an unsatisfactory test.”58 
The category of industries affected with a public interest is 
thus best regarded as a Lochner-era concept whose relevance and 
legitimacy evaporated when the Court declined to subject 
economic regulation to invasive judicial review. Unfortunately, 
many of the participants in the debate fail to recognize its 
problematic nature.59 
More recently, some scholars have attempted to revive the 
category of businesses affected with a public interest by 
redefining the category to refer to “infrastructure,” defined to be 
resources that create positive spillovers.60 Reconceptualizing the 
scope of common carriage in this manner does not seem 
                                                     
 49. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 110–13 (1911). 
 50. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 417 (1914). 
 51. Consumers’ Light & Power Co. v. Phipps, 251 P. 63, 65 (Okla. 1926). This 
decision was later effectively overruled. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 
279–80 (1932). 
 52. Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 535 (1923). 
 53. Nachbar, supra note 23, at 80. 
 54. See 1 KAHN, supra note 20, at 4; 2 KAHN, supra note 20, at 93 (“The courts at 
certain times in effect have substituted their judgment for that of the regulators . . . .”). 
 55. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536 (1934). 
 56. Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. W. Reference & Bond Ass’n, 313 U.S. 236, 245 (1941). 
 57. Siegel, supra note 43, at 206 n.85. 
 58. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974) (quoting Nebbia, 291 
U.S. at 536). 
 59. For notable exceptions, see Crawford, supra note 5, at 883–85. See also 
Nachbar, supra note 23, at 81; Werbach, supra note 15, at 1790. 
 60. See FRISCHMANN, supra note 36, at 104–05; Crawford, supra note 5, at 884; Eli 
M. Noam, Beyond Liberalization II: The Impending Doom of Common Carriage, 18 
TELECOMM. POL’Y 435, 439 (1994); Whitt, supra note 27, at 492–93. 
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consistent with the history of common carriage. As an initial 
matter, the definition appears to be underinclusive, as resources 
such as inns and taverns do not seem to be the type of resources 
that generate positive externalities.61 At the same time, the 
definition fails to include a wide variety of other resources, such 
as printing presses, refinement of metallic ores, steam engines, 
and computers, that generate positive spillovers for other 
products but have never been subject to common carriage 
regulation.62 
More fundamentally, mandated access represents a 
counterintuitive way to correct for positive externalities. The core 
problem associated with positive externalities is systematic 
underproduction.63 Products that generate positive externalities 
create benefits for others that producers do not take into account 
when they are making their production decisions.64 The 
conventional response is to tax activities that generate negative 
externalities to subsidize activities that generate positive ones.65 
Regulation, however, represents an implicit tax rather than a 
subsidy.66 Thus, to the extent that the Internet generates positive 
externalities, imposing regulation would represent the opposite 
policy, systematically causing the systematic bias toward 
underproduction to worsen. 
In addition, the literature on General Purpose Technologies 
(GPTs), a related concept that also focuses on technologies that 
generate positive externalities, identifies a different way that 
mandating access can harm activities that generate positive 
externalities.67 Drawing on the insights of the New Institutional 
                                                     
 61. See Daniel A. Lyons, Public Use, Public Choice, and the Urban Growth Machine: 
Competing Political Economies of Takings Law, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 265, 294–95 
(2009) (noting that bars can produce negative externalities in the form of increased 
crime); Joseph Blocher, Note, Private Business as Public Good: Hotel Development and 
Kelo, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 363, 393 (2006) (“[T]he positive externalities generated by a 
modern hotel are likely to be small or nonexistent.”). 
 62. See RICHARD G. LIPSEY, KENNETH I. CARLAW & CLIFFORD T. BEKAR, ECONOMIC 
TRANSFORMATIONS: GENERAL PURPOSE TECHNOLOGIES AND LONG-TERM ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 131–32 (2005); see also Lyons, supra note 28, at 1044. 
 63.  See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 198, 201–02 (4th 
ed. 2007). 
 64. Id. 
 65. See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 192 (4th ed. 1932) (“[T]he 
State . . . [may] remove the divergence in any field by ‘extraordinary encouragements’ or 
‘extraordinary restraints’ . . . . [such as] bounties and taxes.”) For a modern application, 
see LIPSEY, CARLAW & BEKAR, supra note 62, at 519–20. 
 66. See Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 
22, 27–29, 41 (1971) (“By this test regulation is in part a system of taxation or public 
finance.”). 
 67. See LIPSEY, CARLAW & BEKAR, supra note 62, at 98, 100–04 (arguing that “one of 
the most important aspects of GPTs is that they rejuvenate the growth process by 
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Economics, GPT theory indicates that another way to compensate 
for positive externalities is to allow the producers of the platform 
technology to internalize more of the positive externalities they 
generate by permitting them to vertically integrate into 
complementary products.68 Mandating nondiscriminatory access 
would render this alternative institutional arrangement impossible. 
Judicial attempts to apply the “affected with the public 
interest” test and the concept of infrastructure have both thus failed 
to provide a reliable basis for determining which industries should 
be subject to common carriage regulation. Some commentators 
nonetheless draw comfort from the historical persistence of the 
doctrine, suggesting that its historical pedigree gives the concept 
validity, tied in some unspecified way to the transportation and 
communications industries.69 
Such reasoning violates the fundamental maxim that 
descriptive propositions cannot entail normative ones.70 Simply put, 
one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is” unless one holds a theory 
that judicial decision-making inexorably tends toward socially 
beneficial outcomes,71 the normative justifications for common 
carriage must rise or fall on their own merits without resort to 
history. Any other approach would risk falling into the well-
recognized logical fallacy of simply appealing to tradition.72 
                                                     
creating spillovers that go far beyond the concept of measurable externalities,” and 
describing the necessary conditions for “technological externalities”); Mark A. 
Jamison & Janice A. Hauge, Do Common Carriage, Special Infrastructure, and 
General Purpose Technology Rationales Justify Regulating Communication Networks? 
11–14 (Univ. of Fla., Dep’t of Econ., Pub. Util. Research Ctr., Working Paper No. 13-
09, 2013), available at http://warrington.ufl.edu/centers/purc/purcdocs/ 
papers/1309_Jamison_Do_Common_Carriage.pdf (arguing that the application of 
mandatory access or nondiscriminatory access rules to communication technology is 
problematic because those technologies exhibit characteristics that differ from 
traditional GPTs). 
 68. See Timothy F. Bresnahan & M. Trajtenberg, General Purpose Technologies: 
“Engines of Growth”?, 65 J. ECONOMETRICS 83, 94–96 (1995). 
 69. See Crawford, supra note 5, at 885, 915; Nachbar, supra note 23, at 81–84, 
109; Speta, supra note 12, at 252–53, 255, 257; Whitt, supra note 27, at 491–92; Wu, 
supra note 3, at 30–31. 
 70. 3 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE pt. 1, § 1, at 469–70 (L.A. 
Selby-Bigge ed., 1896); see Patrick M. O'Neil, A Reconciliation of the Humean 
Is/Ought Problem to an Objective Moral Order, 3 CATH. SOC. SCI. REV. 195, 195 
(1998). 
 71. See, e.g., Omychund v. Barker, (1744) 26 Eng. Rep. 15 (Ch.) 22–23 (“[A] 
statute very seldom can take in all cases, therefore the common law, that works itself 
pure by rules drawn from the fountain of justice, is for this reason superior to an act 
of parliament.”); LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 140 (1940); Richard A. 
Posner, The Law and Economics Movement, 77 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 1, 5 
(1987). 
 72. See, e.g., T. EDWARD DAMER, ATTACKING FAULTY REASONING: A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE TO FALLACY-FREE ARGUMENTS 115–17 (7th ed. 2013). 
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 In the context of network neutrality, the appeal to history 
suffers from an even more fundamental shortcoming. Proponents 
and critics of network neutrality both recognize that historically 
common carriage only applied to consumers; it provided no access 
to competitors who wished to interconnect with the incumbent’s 
network or to providers of complements who wished to provide 
services through the incumbent’s network.73 Giving content and 
application providers a right to network access would thus 
represent a significant expansion beyond common carriage’s 
historical scope. As such, it requires an affirmative normative 
rationale to justify deviating from the past. 
Moreover, analogies to the past are only persuasive to the 
extent that the relevant circumstances remain the same. The 
technological and economic environment surrounding the 
Internet is much more robust, variegated, and competitive than 
those surrounding industries subjected to common carriage 
regulation in the past. Indeed, the Internet itself has undergone a 
dramatic transformation over the past two decades, becoming much 
more diverse in terms of end users, applications, end user and 
transmission technologies, and business relationships.74 
As a result, attempts to imbue the phrase, “affected with the 
public interest,” with meaning must be based on more than just 
history. Until the concept is given a coherent definition (and the 
failure of past attempts provides little cause for optimism in this 
regard), it cannot serve as an adequate basis for determining which 
firms are properly regarded as common carriers. 
3. Monopoly Power. The other traditional basis for common 
carriage is the presence of monopoly power. Drawing on the 
language in Munn upholding regulation in part on the fact that the 
grain elevators at issue were a “virtual monopoly,”75 some scholars 
found monopoly power to be the touchstone of common carriage.76 
                                                     
 73. See, e.g., HUBER, KELLOGG & THORNE, supra note 32, § 1.3.1, at 1-13 to -16, 
§ 5.11.1, at 5-163; Barbara A. Cherry, Misusing Network Neutrality to Eliminate Common 
Carriage Threatens Free Speech and the Postal System, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 483, 501 (2006); 
Speta, supra note 12, at 258. In this respect, analogies to the interconnection 
requirements that applied to the telegraph system are misplaced. See FRISCHMANN, supra 
note 36, at 218; Wu, supra note 3, at 29–30. Those interconnection requirements were 
imposed by statute and were not a historical aspect of common carriage. HUBER, KELLOGG 
& THORNE, supra note 32, § 1.3.1, at 1-14. But see Adam Candeub, Network 
Interconnection and Takings, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 369, 377–96 (2004) (recognizing the 
conventional wisdom, but arguing that the law was not as well settled as many presume). 
 74. YOO, supra note 13, at 13–69. 
 75. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 131–32 (1876) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 76. The seminal statement is Bruce Wyman, The Law of the Public Callings as a 
Solution of the Trust Problem (pt. 2), 17 HARV. L. REV. 217, 222–25 (1904). See also Speta, 
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As a purely historical matter, common carriage was not 
limited to industries with monopoly power.77 As part of its 
attempt to exempt new entrants from common carriage 
requirements, the FCC ruled that even providers who held 
themselves out as serving all comers were not common carriers 
unless they possessed market power, only to see this decision 
struck down on judicial review as exceeding the FCC’s statutory 
authority.78 Congress subsequently amended the statute to give 
the FCC the authority to exempt firms that lacked monopoly 
power from common carriage requirements.79 After 
experimenting with different approaches, the FCC now applies a 
traditional market-power framework to determine when it should 
exercise its so-called forbearance authority.80 
Even skeptical commentators recognize that it has become 
the dominant, if not the sole, criterion for determining the scope 
of common carriage.81 
It is hard to argue that the market for last-mile broadband is 
a monopoly.82 The most recent data collected by the FCC indicate 
that as of June 2012, 99% of U.S. households live in census 
                                                     
supra note 12, at 252, 255, 257 (providing a brief history of common carrier rules and 
noting that monopoly power was a key concern). For more modern discussions, see 
generally CHARLES M. HAAR & DANIEL W. FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE OF THE TRACKS 
(1986); Jim Rossi, The Common Law “Duty to Serve” and Protection of Consumers in an 
Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1233 (1998). 
 77. See, e.g., Barbara A. Cherry, How Elevation of Corporate Free Speech Rights 
Affects Legality of Network Neutrality, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 591, 619–20 (2011); Nachbar, 
supra note 23, at 97–100; Speta, supra note 12, at 255–56; Wu, supra note 3, at 30–31; see 
also Crawford, supra note 5, at 883–84 (“There appears to be only a weak correlation 
between market power or natural monopoly and the historical imposition of non-
discrimination obligations.”). 
 78. Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services 
and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, Second Report and Order, 91 F.C.C.2d 59, 61 n.5 
(1982), vacated and remanded sub nom. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186, 
1195–96 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The Supreme Court would ultimately uphold this conclusion. 
MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 233–34 (1994). 
 79. 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)–(b) (2012); see Babette E.L. Boliek, FCC Regulation Versus 
Antitrust: How Internet Neutrality Is Defining the Boundaries, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1627, 1649 
& n.106 (2011) (“There is no doubt that Congress has expressly permitted, in fact 
encouraged, the FCC to forbear from regulating technologies or services that have 
matured into competitive markets.” (citing 47 U.S.C. § 160)). 
 80. Petition of Qwest Corp. for Forbearance Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) in the 
Phoenix, Arizona Metropolitan Statistical Area, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 25 
FCC Rcd. 8622, 8642–43 ¶¶ 37–38 (2010), petition denied sub nom. Qwest Corp. v. FCC, 
689 F.3d 1214, 1234 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 81. See Whitt, supra note 27, at 477; see also Crawford, supra note 5, at 882–83 
(describing the monopoly rationale and how it drives competition for high-speed Internet 
service). 
 82. See generally Christopher S. Yoo, Technological Determinism and Its 
Discontents, 127 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (reviewing SUSAN CRAWFORD, CAPTIVE 
AUDIENCE (2013)). 
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blocks with access to two or more fixed line or mobile wireless 
broadband providers capable of providing the benchmark speeds 
of 3 Mbps downstream and 768 kbps upstream, and 92% have 
access to three or more.83 In addition, 88% of U.S. households 
have access to two or more providers providing service at the 
higher standard of 6 Mbps downstream and 1.5 Mbps upstream, 
and 62% have access to three or more.84 Even at the highest tier 
reported (10 Mbps downstream and 1.5 Mbps upstream), 62% 
had access to two or more providers, and 23% had access to three 
or more.85 
The biggest change in the market is wireless broadband. 
Although service based around 3G technologies remained 
relatively slow, wireless broadband providers began to deploy a 
4G technology known as Long Term Evolution (LTE), which is 
delivering on average much higher speeds.86 Although some have 
expressed skepticism that LTE can ever be a substitute for fixed-
line broadband, recent studies appearing in the trade press 
indicate that market leaders, Verizon and AT&T, provide 
average download speeds of 14 Mbps and 19 Mbps respectively, 
with average peaks of 49 Mbps and 58 Mbps.87 Late arrivers, 
Sprint and T-Mobile, are lagging behind, but Sprint is able to 
provide average download speeds of 10 Mbps and peak speeds of 
33 Mbps.88 And on the horizon is the next-generation wireless 
technology known as LTE Advanced, which is already being 
deployed in other countries and is capable of delivering speeds of 
up to 150 Mbps to 300 Mbps.89 
If anything, the June 2012 data underrepresent the current 
competitiveness of the market. As of November 2012, Verizon 
had extended LTE to 83% of its service area, and AT&T only 
reached 51%, while Sprint had just started to roll out LTE in 
mid-2013, and T-Mobile had not yet begun.90 Verizon completed 
                                                     
 83. INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, INTERNET ACCESS 
SERVICES: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2012, at 10 fig.5(b) (2013), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-321076A1.pdf. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Patrick Linder, Lightning-Fast Data Speeds and Expanding Coverage: A 4G 
LTE Performance Review, ROOTMETRICS (Mar. 11, 2003), http://www.rootmetrics.com/ 
special-reports/lte-performance-review/. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Yoo, supra note 82. 
 90. Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to 
Mobile Wireless, Including Commercial Mobile Services, Sixteenth Report, 28 FCC Rcd. 
3700, 3706–07 ¶ 2, 3745 tbl.3, 3823 tbl.28, 3824–31 ¶¶ 187–197 (2013). 
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its LTE deployment in mid-2013, while AT&T plans to reach 80% 
of the country by the end of 2013 and complete its buildout by the 
end of 2014.91 Sprint and T-Mobile are moving aggressively, each 
forecasting to reach two thirds of the country by the end of 
2013.92 Even smaller, regional providers, such as Leap, US 
Cellular, and C-Spire, are beginning to deploy the technology.93 
Once these wireless providers complete the buildout of their 
networks, the market should be even more competitive. As of 
October 2012, 98% of U.S. residents live in census blocks served 
by two or more 3G wireless providers, with 92% being served by 
three or more and 82% being served by four or more.94 This is in 
addition, of course, to the services offered by fixed line providers. 
The extensive investment in infrastructure underscores the 
industry participants’ belief that investing in competitive 
infrastructure is still financially viable. 
Although competition policy would ideally hope for even more 
competitors, the high fixed cost nature of this industry makes such 
entry unlikely.95 Fortunately, empirical studies indicate that 
markets with three firms are workably competitive, with most of 
the competitive benefit occurring with the entry of the second or 
third firm and minimal benefits resulting from entry in markets 
that already have three to five firms.96 Indeed, antitrust authorities 
routinely approve four-to-three mergers.97 Moreover, one must also 
take into account that regulation is costly and enforcement is 
imperfect. FCC and FTC Chief Economist and current OIRA head 
Howard Shelanski has observed that the regulatory cost-benefit 
calculus changes once a market becomes an oligopoly, even if it 
remains quite concentrated.98 The poor performance of unregulated 
monopoly justifies bearing the significant costs of regulation.99 
However, an unregulated oligopoly performs sufficiently better as to 
tip the balance in favor of deregulation.100 
The case for imposing common carriage regulation because 
of market power is even harder to make with respect to IP-based 
                                                     
 91. Id.. 
 92. Id. at 3745 tbl.3, 3827–31 ¶¶ 191–200. 
 93. Id. at 3745 tbl.3, 3824 tbl.28, 3827–31 ¶¶ 198–200. 
 94. Id. at 3700, 3706 ¶ 2, 3750 tbl.9. 
 95. Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 9, 29–
30, 63–64 (2005). 
 96. Timothy F. Bresnahan & Peter C. Reiss, Entry and Competition in 
Concentrated Markets, 99 J. POL. ECON. 977, 978 (1991). 
 97. Yoo, supra note 95, at 61 n.233. 
 98. Howard A. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to Competition: Toward a New 
Model for U.S. Telecommunications Policy, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 55, 84–93 (2007). 
 99. Id. at 86–87. 
 100. Id. at 84, 87. 
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services other than broadband Internet access. The markets 
for VoIP, cloud services, wireless devices, and online mapping 
services are all subject to robust competition.101 Even though 
the leading search engines and social networking platforms 
have relatively high market shares, the facts that they 
themselves are new entrants and switching costs are low 
counsel strongly against regulatory intervention.102 
4. Transmission Without Transformation. An alternative 
definition of common carriage emerged in National Association 
of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FCC (NARUC II), a 
follow-up decision in which the court emphasized a second 
requirement that NARUC I only mentioned in passing.103 This 
requirement, formulated by the FCC and noted to have 
“peculiar applicability to the communications field,” holds that 
common carriage also requires that customers “transmit 
intelligence of their own design and choosing.”104 
This approach eventually became embedded in the statute, 
which now ties common carriage obligations to the definition of 
“telecommunications carrier” when it states that “[a] 
telecommunications carrier shall be treated as a common 
carrier under this chapter only to the extent that it is engaged 
in providing telecommunications services.”105 The statute 
further defines “telecommunications service” as “the offering of 
telecommunications for a fee directly to the public.”106 
“Telecommunications” is in turn defined as “the transmission, 
between or among points specified by the user, of information 
of the user’s choosing, without change in the form or content of 
the information as sent and received.”107 The Supreme Court 
and the FCC have characterized telecommunications as “pure” 
transmission capability over a path that is virtually 
“transparent” in terms of interaction with customer 
information.108 If a firm instead combines transmission with 
                                                     
 101. See id. at 73–76. 
 102. Christopher S. Yoo, When Antitrust Met Facebook, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
1147, 1150–53, 1160–62 (2012). 
 103. Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC (NARUC II), 533 F.2d 601, 
609 (D.C. Cir. 1976) 
 104. NARUC II, 533 F.2d at 609 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 105. 47 U.S.C. § 153(51) (2012). This provision gives the FCC the discretion over 
whether fixed and mobile satellite services are subject to common carriage. Id. 
 106. Id. § 153(53). 
 107. Id. § 153(50). 
 108. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
976–77 (2005) (citing Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and  
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other functions, such as “generating, acquiring, storing, 
transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making 
available information,” it is offering an “information service.”109 
Information services are exempt from common carriage 
regulation.110 Congress and the FCC have both noted that 
information services and telecommunications services 
represent mutually exclusive categories.111 
In other words, firms that offer pure, transparent 
transmission capability to the public between points chosen by 
the end user with no computer processing or storage are 
common carriers. Firms that instead offer a service that 
combines transmission with additional functions, such as 
computer processing or storage, provide an information service 
that is not subject to common carriage. It is true that all 
Internet-based services rely on some form of transmission (i.e., 
telecommunications), but the fact that transmission is offered 
only when combined with other functions means that they are not 
providing the type of pure transmission capability associated with 
common carriage.112 
The FCC has ruled that a wide variety of forms of broadband 
access, including cable-modem service, DSL, wireless broadband, 
and broadband over powerline, are information services that are not 
subject to common carriage.113 In National Cable & 
Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services, the 
Supreme Court upheld this decision with respect to cable-modem 
services as a reasonable interpretation of the statute.114 
In so holding, the Brand X Court followed the FCC by 
noting two prominent ways that most broadband providers 
                                                     
Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 420 ¶ 96 
(1980) [hereinafter Computer II Final Decision]). 
 109. 47 U.S.C. § 153(24) (internal quotations omitted). 
 110. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 975–78. 
 111. S. REP. NO. 104-23, at 1–2, 18, 23, 98 (1995); Appropriate Framework for 
Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities, Report and Order and Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd. 14853, 14862–65 ¶¶ 12–17, 14909–12 ¶¶ 102–106 
(2005), petition for review denied sub nom. Time Warner Telecom, Inc. v. FCC, 507 F.3d 
205 (3d Cir. 2007); Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and 
Other Facilities, Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling, Appropriate Regulatory 
Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable Facilities, Declaratory Ruling 
and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4821–23 ¶¶ 37–38 (2002), aff’d 
sub nom. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 987–
91, 1000 (2005); Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13 
FCC Rcd. 11501, 11520–26 ¶¶ 39–48, 11536–40 ¶¶ 73–82 (1998). 
 112. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 987–88, 999–1000. 
 113. See supra note 6 (demonstrating that the FCC has consistently ruled that 
different forms of broadband access are considered information services). 
 114. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 989–1000. 
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combine processing and storage with transmission. The first is 
caching, in which broadband access providers store popular 
content on a server located in its local facilities rather than 
downloading separate copies for every individual request for web 
content.115 Caching content locally reduces the burden on the 
long-haul network, reduces latency based on distance, reduces 
server congestion, and protects content against denial of service 
attacks.116 Some companies known as Content Delivery Networks 
(CDNs) have turned such caching services into a business 
model.117 At the same time, large content providers such as 
Google have begun to place duplicate content in multiple 
locations known as server farms.118 The Supreme Court concluded 
that these caching services constitute sufficient acquiring, 
storing, retrieving, and utilizing information to make classifying 
Internet access as an information service a reasonable 
interpretation of the statute.119 
The second is known as the Domain Name System (DNS).120 
The Internet Protocol (IP) is often described as the glue that 
holds the entire Internet together.121 It operates on addresses 
that are represented as numbers, with IP version 4 (IPv4) 
addresses often being depicted as four numbers between 0 and 
255 separated by periods, such as 128.91.34.233 (which is one of 
the IP addresses for the University of Pennsylvania).122 Most 
browsers do not use IP addresses.123 Instead, they expect end 
users to rely on domain names, which are often the name of a 
company or an institution followed by “.com,” “.gov,” “.edu,” or 
“.us.”124 DNS is the system that translates the domain name into 
the IP address that identifies the physical location where the 
resource being accessed resides.125 DNS thus represents an 
essential function that is offered by every broadband Internet 
access provider. Indeed, as the Supreme Court has noted in 
Brand X, “[a] user cannot reach a third-party’s Web site without 
DNS.”126 
                                                     
 115. See id. at 998–1000. 
 116. See id. 
 117. YOO, supra note 13, at 66–68. 
 118. Id. at 68. 
 119. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 999–1000. 
 120. YOO, supra note 13, at 85–86. 
 121. ANDREW S. TANENBAUM, COMPUTER NETWORKS § 5.6, at 432 (4th ed. 2003). 
 122. Id. § 5.6.2, at 437. 
 123. Id. § 7.1, at 579–80. 
 124. Id. § 7.1.1, at 580–82. 
 125. YOO, supra note 13, at 85–86. 
 126. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 999 
(2005). 
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Although all of the mappings of domain names to IP 
addresses used to reside in a single file maintained by a single 
person, Internet engineers soon concluded that this system would 
not scale.127 Instead of relying on a single point for resolving DNS 
inquiries, the Internet was redesigned so that each IP address 
was associated with a single authoritative server. Providers 
receiving a DNS request query the authoritative server to 
determine the proper address.128 Any use of the Internet that 
relies on DNS thus necessarily invokes a vast array of DNS 
servers distributed throughout the world. These DNS servers 
represent computing power sufficient to establish Internet 
communications as information services rather than 
telecommunications services. 
Moreover, DNS providers are increasingly offering “smart 
DNS” functions that increase the functionality of the services 
offered by broadband Internet access providers.129 Because DNS 
queries often involve significant delays, most DNS providers do 
not send a separate request to the authoritative server for every 
query. Instead, they cache DNS responses and simply resolve 
duplicate queries submitted within the designated “time to live” 
by retrieving the cached address instead of independently 
verifying each individual request.130 Other services include faster 
name resolution, greater network security, protection against 
denial of service attacks, botnet detection, web error redirection, 
parental controls, and a host of other advanced services.131 
Even more importantly, as the phenomenon of caching 
makes clear, content can reside in more than one location. It is 
the DNS that determines from which location a particular end 
user retrieves the information.132 Moreover, some domain names 
resolve to two or more IP addresses. For example, the domain 
name “http://www.upenn.edu” encompasses two IP addresses: 
128.91.34.233 and 128.91.34.234. DNS will determine which of 
the two addresses will serve the particular request.133 Similarly, if 
                                                     
 127. YOO, supra note 13, at 85–86. 
 128. TANENBAUM, supra note 121, § 7.1, at 580–83; see Paul Mockapetris, Domain 
Names—Concepts and Facilities 40 (Internet Eng’g Task Force Network Working Grp., 
Request for Comments No. 1034, 1987), available at http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc1034.pdf. 
 129. See Christopher S. Yoo, Rough Consensus and Running Code: Integrating 
Engineering Principles into Internet Policy Debates, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 341, 351 (2011); 
Mockapetris, supra note 128, at 2–3. 
 130. See Mockapetris, supra note 128, at 12. 
 131. YOO, supra note 13, at 90–91. 
 132. See TANENBAUM, supra note 121, § 7.1, at 580; see also Christopher S. Yoo, 
Protocol Layering and Internet Policy, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1707, 1768–69 (2013); Yoo, supra 
note 129, at 351. 
 133. See TANENBAUM, supra note 121, § 7.1, at 580–83. 
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one is in Japan and enters “www.google.com,” DNS will 
automatically redirect the request to the Japanese language 
version of Google’s website available at “www.google.co.jp.” 
Thus, when an end user accesses content that is stored in 
multiple locations across the Internet, it is DNS—and not the 
end user—that decides which of the many content storage 
locations is the closest and least congested and routes the request 
to that location.134 The fact that DNS determines from which of 
the multiple available endpoints a particular query will be served 
makes it hard to characterize Internet communications as being 
between “points specified by the user” as required by the 
definition of telecommunications service.135 
The Supreme Court specifically cited the reliance on DNS as 
sufficient to render reasonable the FCC’s conclusion that 
Internet services involve “acquiring . . . retrieving, utilizing, or 
making available” website addresses sufficient to render Internet 
access an information service.136 In addition, the Court noted that 
the FCC ruled that instead of offering standalone transmission, 
broadband Internet access providers offer a suite of services, such 
as e-mail, newsgroups, and webpage hosting that combine 
computer processing with transmission.137 Broadband Internet 
access providers also typically include spam filtering, virus 
protection, and a wide range of other services that far exceed the 
transparent transmission associated with telecommunications 
services.138 
Anyone attempting to argue that Internet access is a 
telecommunications service subject to common carriage 
requirements thus faces a difficult burden. Not only must they 
rebut numerous FCC decisions concluding the contrary,139 they 
must overcome the Supreme Court’s decision in Brand X 
upholding the FCC’s decision exempting cable modem service 
from Title II common carriage regulation.140 
Of course, to say that those wishing to subject Internet 
access to common carriage face a heavy burden is not to say that 
it is impossible. Although a run of agency precedents creates a 
presumption, an agency can change course without its decision 
being arbitrary or capricious so long as it provides a reasoned 
                                                     
 134. Id. § 7.1, at 580–83, 586–87. 
 135. 47 U.S.C. § 153(50) (2012). 
 136. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 999 
(2005) (alteration in original) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2000)). 
 137. Id. at 987, 998. 
 138. See YOO, supra note 13, at 90–91. 
 139. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 140. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 989–1000. 
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explanation.141 Moreover, Brand X upheld the FCC’s conclusion 
that Internet access was not subject to common carriage 
regulation on the basis of Chevron deference, concluding that the 
FCC’s interpretation of the statute was reasonable and 
confirming that agencies retain the latitude to change their 
interpretations of statutes.142 As such, Brand X leaves open the 
possibility that a later court would find some other interpretation 
of the FCC’s statutory mandate also to be reasonable, including 
one concluding that Internet access is a telecommunications 
service. 
Indeed, the FCC appeared to have considered taking just 
such a course in the summer of 2010 when it floated a proposal to 
reclassify last-mile broadband access as a telecommunications 
service subject to the common carriage requirements enumerated 
in Title II.143 Although the proposal offered for the FCC to use its 
forbearance authority to waive many of these requirements, this 
decision would be discretionary and subject to reconsideration at 
the FCC’s pleasure.144 The fact that the proposal relied almost 
exclusively on the dissent in Brand X rather than the majority 
opinion implicitly conceded that it was inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court’s decision.145 
That said, even under Chevron deference, step one 
requires analyzing the text of the statute.146 Only if the text is 
ambiguous do courts proceed to Chevron step two, where they 
defer to any reasonable construction of the statute put forth by 
the agency that administers the statute.147 The fact that 
broadband Internet access combines transmission with 
processing and storage makes it quite likely that a reviewing 
court would regard the plain language of the statute as 
controlling.148 Moreover, any such argument would have to 
contend with the D.C. Circuit’s 2010 decision in Comcast Corp. 
v. FCC, which held that the FCC’s attempt to sanction 
                                                     
 141. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514–15 (2009). 
 142. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980–81, 986. 
 143. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (describing the FCC’s proposal to 
reclassify broadband access as a telecommunications service). 
 144. GENACHOWSKI, supra note 7, at 2, 5–6; SCHLICK, supra note 7, at 3–6. 
 145. See SCHLICK, supra note 7, at 3, 5–6. 
 146. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984). 
 147. Id. at 843. 
 148. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 
U.S. 967, 986–89 (2005) (affirming the FCC’s conclusion that “cable modem service is 
not a telecommunications offering because the consumer uses the high-speed wire 
always in connection with the information-processing capabilities provided by 
Internet access”). 
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Comcast’s network management practices fell outside of its 
Title II jurisdiction as well as its ancillary authority under 
Title I.149 
A reviewing court must thus overcome a number of obstacles 
before it could conclude that broadband Internet access is subject 
to common carriage under the current statute. These obstacles do 
not conclusively foreclose the possibility of extending common 
carriage regulation to Internet-based services. Congress may, of 
course, enact new legislation declaring broadband Internet access 
providers to be common carriers or giving the FCC the authority 
to do so. It thus makes sense to evaluate the extent to which 
doing so would represent good policy. 
Any attempt to subject end-user devices to common carriage 
obligations would also likely fail, as multiple judicial precedents 
exist squarely holding that the FCC lacks Title II jurisdiction 
over such devices.150 Common carriage would be even more 
difficult to apply to services such as search engines, cloud 
computing, online maps, and social networks, as all of them 
involve computer processing and many of them represent 
standalone, over-the-top services that do not provide any 
transport whatsoever and require end users to obtain their own 
transport from an independent provider.151 The lone exception is 
interconnected VoIP, which because of its close connection with 
conventional telephony falls within the FCC’s Title II or ancillary 
jurisdiction.152 
                                                     
 149. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 645, 654, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The 
D.C. Circuit will likely shed more light on the scope of the Comcast decision when it 
resolves the pending judicial challenges to the Open Internet Order. See Preserving 
the Open Internet, Report and Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, 17926–31 ¶¶ 37, 42, 
17968–71 ¶¶ 118, 122, 17980–81 ¶ 136 (2010). 
 150. See Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 691–92 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding 
that the FCC does not have the authority to regulate end-user devices after the 
completion of a broadcast transmission). 
 151. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 988–90; supra text accompanying notes 12–21. 
 152. The FCC has invoked this jurisdiction to impose requirements regarding 
interconnected VoIP regarding service outage reporting, number portability, disability 
access, E911 service, and universal service. See Proposed Extension of Part 4 of the 
Commission’s Rules Regarding Outage Reporting to Interconnected Voice Over Internet 
Protocol Service Providers and Broadband Internet Service Providers, Report and Order, 
27 FCC Rcd. 2650, 2674–79 ¶¶ 60–67 (2012) (showing that the FCC has jurisdiction over 
VoIP regarding the above requirements); Telephone Number Requirements for IP-
Enabled Services Providers, Report and Order, Declaratory Ruling, Order on Remand, 
and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 FCC Rcd. 19531, 19543–48 ¶¶ 21–29 (2007) 
(same); IP-Enabled Services, Report and Order, 22 FCC Rcd. 11275, 11286–89 ¶¶ 21–
24, 11292–93 ¶¶ 34–35 (2007) (same); Universal Service Contribution Methodology, 
Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 21 FCC Rcd. 7518, 7538–41 
¶¶ 38–45 (2006) (same); IP-Enabled Services, First Report and Order and Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd. 10245, 10261–66 ¶¶ 26–36 (2005) (same). 
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B. The Duties of Common Carriers 
The affirmative obligations imposed on common carriers are 
established by the provisions of Title II of the Communications 
Act of 1934.153 For our purposes, it suffices to focus on four: entry 
restrictions and the duty to serve, the obligation to charge rates 
that are nondiscriminatory, the obligation to charge rates that 
are just and reasonable, and structural separation. 
1.  Entry Restrictions and the Duty to Serve. Before 
initiating service, common carriers must obtain regulatory 
authorization in the form of a certificate of public convenience 
and necessity.154 Until authorized by the authorities to 
discontinue service,155 common carriers that have established 
service must satisfy all reasonable requests for service.156 
2. Nondiscrimination. Section 202 prohibits charges that 
constitute “unjust or unreasonable discrimination.”157 The 
traditional regulatory instrument employed to ensure 
nondiscrimination is the tariff. The tariffing process begins 
when telecommunications carriers file schedules containing all 
of the rates, terms, and conditions under which they will offer 
service at least 120 days before they are to go into effect, 
during which time the agency has the option to review the 
rates.158 
The Supreme Court has called the tariff the embodiment 
of the “antidiscriminatory policy which lies at ‘the heart of the 
common-carrier section of the Communications Act.’”159 Once 
the tariff has been approved, regulators ensure 
nondiscrimination by requiring the carrier to offer service 
under the terms specified by the tariff to any requesting party 
that qualifies to receive the service. Concerns about secret 
discounts led courts to treat the tariffed rate as a floor, as well 
as a ceiling.160 Under the so-called filed rate doctrine, the 
tariffed terms constitute the entirety of the contractual 
agreement between the customer and the carrier and leave the 
parties no latitude to adjust prices, services, or any other 
                                                     
 153. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–203 (2012). 
 154. Id. § 214(a). 
 155. Id. § 214(a)(3). 
 156. Id. § 201(a). 
 157. Id. § 202(a). 
 158. Id. § 203(a), (b)(1). 
 159. AT&T Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 223 (1998) (quoting MCI 
Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 229 (1994)). 
 160. Id. at 221–24; MCI Telecomms. Corp., 512 U.S. at 229–31. 
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terms, even if one of the parties materially misrepresents the 
terms.161 
3. Just and Reasonable Rates. Section 201(b) requires that 
all charges be “just and reasonable.”162 The obligation to charge 
reasonable rates found its roots in the earliest beginnings of 
English law163 and has a long history in U.S. law.164 Indeed, the 
duty was included in the very first federal telecommunications 
regulatory statute, the Mann-Elkins Act, enacted in 1910.165 
Unless structural separation or vertical disintegration is also 
imposed, rate regulation is necessary to prevent a vertically-
integrated provider from favoring its own proprietary 
complementary services at the expense of those offered by 
unaffiliated providers. Absent rate regulation, the firm can 
exclude its competitors without violating its nondiscrimination 
obligations simply by charging an arbitrarily high price. A price 
sufficiently high would effectively lock out all competitors 
without imposing any harm on the common carrier.166 Its only 
effect would be to transfer profit from one part of the company to 
another.167 
And even if structural separation is mandated, to the extent 
that the provider is a monopoly, rate regulation is necessary to 
ensure that consumers receive some benefit. Unless accompanied 
by a mandatory reduction in price, a mere nondiscrimination 
mandate would only require that the monopoly be shared, which 
                                                     
 161. 47 U.S.C. § 203(c). The seminal case on the filed rate doctrine is Louisville 
& Nashville Railroad v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 97–100 (1915). For a modern 
reaffirmation in the context of telecommunications, see Cent. Office Tel., 524 U.S. at 
221–23. 
 162. 47 U.S.C. § 201(b). 
 163. See Allnutt v. Inglis, (1810) 104 Eng. Rep. 206 (K.B.) 210–11 (Lord 
Ellenborough, C.J.); HALE, supra note 38, at 77–78. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the Railroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 
1017, 1045 (1988) (“As early as the 17th century, the common law had derived the duty to 
charge reasonable rates from the common carrier’s obligation to serve everyone. . . .”). 
 164. See H.W. Chaplin, Limitations upon the Right of Withdrawal from Public 
Employment, 16 HARV. L. REV. 555, 556–57 (1903) (identifying charging reasonable rates 
as one of the three fundamental duties imposed on common carriers). See generally 
Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated 
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1330–31 (1998) (“For almost a century, public 
utility companies and common carriers had one common characteristic: All were required 
to offer their customers service under rates and practices that were just, reasonable, and 
non-discriminatory.”). 
 165. See SPULBER & YOO, supra note 37, at 234. 
 166. See VISCUSI, HARRINGTON & VERNON, supra note 20, at 168–69; Christopher S. 
Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 
171, 192–93 (2002). 
 167. See VISCUSI, HARRINGTON & VERNON, supra note 20, at 238–40; Yoo, supra note 
166, at 192–93. 
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would only lead the monopolist to charge everyone the full 
monopoly price.168 
That said, some have suggested that rate regulation is not 
part of common carriage. Some claim that a simple 
nondiscrimination mandate would be sufficient.169 Others say an 
interconnection requirement would be enough and that end 
users’ ability to arbitrage along different paths is sufficient to 
protect their interests.170 This is clearly the minority position. 
Even those favoring these regimes generally recognize that some 
rate regulation is required and focus on regimes that will 
minimize the burdens.171 
4. Structural Separation. The imposition of rate regulation 
inevitably requires regulators to mandate structural separation. 
Carriers can evade rate regulation simply by vertically 
integrating into an unregulated complementary market, 
bundling the goods, and building the monopoly markup into the 
price of the unregulated good.172 Firms that use the same assets 
to produce both regulated and unregulated goods can allocate 
common costs to the regulated good.173 This gives the firm a 
competitive advantage in the unregulated market, while allowing 
it to rely on regulation to ensure that it recovers all of the 
common costs in the regulated market.174 
For this reason, it is generally understood that any firm 
subject to common carriage regulation must be prohibited from 
entering into unregulated lines of business.175 Structural 
separation has the added benefit of making nondiscrimination 
easier to enforce. When all transactions are done at arm’s length, 
regulators can simply require that the provider offer the same 
terms to all of its customers.176 
                                                     
 168. F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 109 (3d ed. 1990); Yoo, supra note 166, at 244–47. 
 169. Wu, supra note 3, at 43–44. 
 170. Noam, supra note 60, at 452. Kevin Werbach makes a similar point but 
acknowledges the need for some form of rate regulation. Werbach, supra note 23, at 1294–
98. 
 171. Speta, supra note 12, at 276; Werbach, supra note 23, at 1298. 
 172. Yoo, supra note 166, at 192–96. 
 173. SPULBER & YOO, supra note 37, at 293. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 130–31. 
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III. CONSIDERATIONS WEIGHING AGAINST IMPOSING COMMON 
CARRIAGE ON INTERNET-BASED SERVICES 
Even if the legal barriers can be overcome, as a matter of 
policy, proposals advocating the extension of common carriage 
regulation to Internet-based services must engage the 
substantial body of scholarship analyzing the regime’s 
shortcomings. This Part will review some of the high points of 
this literature and discuss the problems in enforcing 
nondiscrimination, the challenges in determining reasonable 
rates, and the danger that common carriage might facilitate 
collusion. 
A. Enforcing Nondiscrimination 
The textbook definition of discrimination is a price 
differential for the same product that is not justified by 
differences in product quality or cost.177 Identifying 
discrimination thus requires far more than simply seeing 
whether firms are charging customers the same price. Regulators 
must examine whether any of the price differences may be 
justified by variations in product attributes or in the cost of 
serving those customers. Interestingly, regulators must make 
these evaluations even when the prices charged are the same.178 
Charging two customers the same price can be discriminatory if 
providing the product or service to those customers differs in 
terms of quality or cost.179 
In addition, economists and policymakers have long 
recognized the potential virtues of demand-side price 
discrimination that is related not to differences in product 
quality or cost, but rather based on the intensity of different 
customers’ preferences for the product. The insights and 
challenges posed by this type of discrimination are reflected in 
the longstanding debate over Ramsey pricing.180 
1. Differences in Quality. As noted above, any 
nondiscrimination mandate must evaluate whether any price 
                                                     
 177. See, e.g., SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 168, at 489; JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 133–34 (1988). 
 178. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 14.6, at 581 (3d ed. 1994); SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 
168, at 489, 510, 513–14. 
 179. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 178, § 14.6, at 581; SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 
168, at 489, 510, 513–14. 
 180. See Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 
GEO. L.J. 1847, 1901–04 (2006). 
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differences are justified by variations in product quality. As a 
result, common carriage regimes work best for commodities for 
which product quality does not vary. Classic examples include 
water, natural gas, and electric power.181 
For Internet-based services, the sources of variations in 
quality are vast. As an initial matter, quality of service on 
broadband networks varies along as many as four dimensions: 
bandwidth, delay, jitter, and reliability.182 Whereas voice 
communications on the telephone network operated only within a 
narrow range of service parameters, the services that network 
providers offer and that applications demand can vary widely. 
Indeed, the benefits from allowing more diverse offerings were 
one of the reasons for declining to subject enhanced services to 
common carriage regulation.183 
Moreover, the inherent limits on propagation speeds means 
that users communicating with distant locations will necessarily 
receive less bandwidth.184 The feedback-based congestion control 
mechanisms embedded in the Transmission Control Protocol 
(TCP) exacerbate this problem by allowing transmission sessions 
with shorter feedback loops to increase their sending rates more 
rapidly than sessions with longer feedback loops.185 Further 
difficulties arise from the fact that quality of service is also the 
product of how other subscribers are using the network. If 
everyone generates traffic at the same time, everyone receives 
lower quality of service in ways that could justify cost 
differentials but are difficult to observe.186 
                                                     
 181. See CHURCH & WARE, supra note 20, § 26.2.3, at 853–54; Eli M. Noam, Towards 
an Integrated Communications Market: Overcoming the Local Monopoly of Cable 
Television, 34 FED. COMM. L.J. 209, 219 (1982). 
 182. TANENBAUM, supra note 121, § 5.4.1, at 397. 
 183. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 108, at 428–30 ¶¶ 115–118. 
Interestingly, the nondiscrimination mandate embodied in the Open Internet Order is 
more restrictive than the nondiscrimination mandate reflected in traditional common carriage. 
Under common carriage, providers can charge different prices for different classes of service so 
long as they make that service available to all similarly situated customers. Although the Open 
Internet Order permits providers to offer different classes of service to end users, it forbids 
offering different classes of service to content and application providers even if they make each 
class of service available to everyone. Lyons, supra note 28, at 1058. 
 184. YOO, supra note 13, at 46–48; see Erik Brynjolfsson, Paul Hofmann & John Jordan, 
Cloud Computing and Electricity: Beyond the Utility Model, COMM. ACM, May 2010, at 32, 34. 
The natural limits imposed by the speed of light are exacerbated in wireless networks, where 
natural attenuation and the addition of noise requires data destined for more distant locations 
to be encoded using modulations that necessarily provide less bandwidth. YOO, supra note 13, 
at 46–48. 
 185. Christopher S. Yoo, Herbert Wechsler in Cyberspace: Applying the Critique of Neutral 
Principles to Internet Policy (forthcoming 2014). 
 186. Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality, Consumers, and Innovation, 2008 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 179, 206. 
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This is why many observers regard Internet-based services 
as particularly ill-suited to common carriage regulation.187 For 
example, cloud computing is based on networking services that 
are highly differentiated and nonfungible in terms of service level 
and functionality, with the needs of different customers varying 
widely.188 
2. Differences in Cost. Moreover, when production 
technologies vary, regulators imposing nondiscrimination 
mandates must carefully scrutinize production technologies and 
costs. Indeed, the failure to take such cost differentials into 
account has been a major source of criticism of the way price 
discrimination is addressed under the antitrust laws.189 
Such cost differentials are likely to be quite prevalent in 
Internet access services. As an initial matter, Internet access is 
provided by a wide range of production technologies, including 
cable modem service, fiber-based service, DSL service, and 
wireless broadband. Each of these services varies widely both in 
terms of cost and in terms of product quality. 
Even more importantly for our purposes, even within the 
same production technology, the cost of providing service can 
vary widely from customer to customer. In network industries, 
the primary expense is in the fixed cost needed to establish the 
principal line providing service to a neighborhood, which is large 
compared to the cost of connecting individual subscribers to that 
line.190 When that is the case, the principal determinant of unit 
cost is the density of subscribers in any particular area, as 
increases in density permits fixed costs to be amortized over a 
larger number of subscribers.191 
One would thus expect subscribers in more densely 
populated areas to pay less than those in areas in which 
subscribership is sparser. Most regulatory authorities mandate 
rate averaging to ensure that all customers pay the same amount 
regardless of location. For example, public utility commissions 
have generally set rates for local telephone service that are 
uniform across the entire state even though the real costs of 
                                                     
 187. Yoo, supra note 180, at 1852–53. 
 188. See Ergin Bayrak, John P. Conley & Simon Wilkie, The Economics of Cloud 
Computing, 27 KOREAN ECON. REV. 203, 211–12 (2011); Brynjolfsson, Hofmann & Jordan, 
supra note 184, at 34; Kenji E. Kushida, Jonathan Murray & John Zysman, Diffusing the 
Cloud: Cloud Computing and Implications for Public Policy, 11 J. INDUS. COMPETITION & 
TRADE 209, 212 (2011). 
 189. See, e.g., CHURCH & WARE, supra note 20, § 5.5, at 177; VISCUSI, HARRINGTON & 
VERNON, supra note 20, at 343–44. 
 190. See Shelanski, supra note 98, at 60, 89–90. 
 191. See id. at 60, 85, 89–90; see also Bresnahan & Reiss, supra note 96, at 980–83. 
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providing service vary.192 In this way, somewhat ironically, the 
traditional implementation of common carriage violates 
fundamental principles of nondiscrimination. Stated somewhat 
differently, by implicitly requiring urban subscribers to cross-
subsidize the connectivity of rural subscribers, uniform rate 
structure violates the fundamental principle of 
nondiscrimination that the actual rates charged be subsidy 
free.193 Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized that imposing such 
cross subsidies in the name of promoting universal service 
represented “state-sanctioned discrimination.”194 
Implementing nondiscriminatory pricing is also greatly 
complicated by the manner in which the cost of providing service 
varies over different parts of the day and different locations.195 
The primary source of costs in the Internet is congestion, which 
arises when multiple subscribers use the network at the same 
time.196 Congestion, moreover, only becomes problematic when 
network components become fully saturated, making the actual 
costs of providing service highly dependent on actual levels of 
usage.197 More specifically, they are likely to vary widely from 
moment to moment.198 In addition, technologies such as cable-
modem service and wireless broadband aggregate traffic locally, 
making subscribers highly susceptible to the usage levels of their 
immediate neighbors.199 This means that congestion can also vary 
geographically, with one node being saturated, while the adjacent 
node is not. 
Any true pricing scheme that was truly nondiscriminatory 
would thus vary from minute to minute as well as from place to 
place. Such a regime would face significant implementation 
problems. As an initial matter, the localized nature of the 
Internet means that each network provider is only aware of local 
conditions. It has no systematic way of discerning congestion 
levels of its downstream partners when it hands off traffic.200 
Although those channel partners could share that information, 
network providers jealously guard information about the 
                                                     
 192. See Shelanski, supra note 98, at 60. 
 193. See, e.g., CHURCH & WARE, supra note 20, § 26.2.1, at 846; VISCUSI, 
HARRINGTON & VERNON, supra note 20, at 445–47. 
 194. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 480 (2002). 
 195. Yoo, supra note 186, at 189–90, 194–95, 201–02, 206–11. 
 196. Id. at 189, 207–11. 
 197. Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, On the Regulation of Networks as 
Complex Systems: A Graph Theory Approach, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1687, 1709–13 (2005). 
 198. Yoo, supra note 186, at 210–11. 
 199. Id. at 201–02, 208–11. 
 200. Id. at 210–11. 
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configuration of their networks and the loads being carried by 
them.201 In addition, network providers would have to provide 
extensive new systems to monitor and propagate information 
about network usage and pricing at a timescale relevant to actual 
costs.202 Moreover, although permitting traffic levels to grow 
without any change in price so long as the network is slack would 
reflect actual costs, such an approach would cause network 
resources to become locked out as soon as they became saturated. 
Such sharp discontinuities in network behavior can cascade into 
synchronization that can lead to wide-scale disruptions and 
inefficient usage of network resources.203 Finally, subscribers’ 
ability to adjust to dynamic pricing is rather limited. Indeed, 
research indicates that they cannot process pricing plans that 
involve more than three dayparts.204 
All of these considerations are likely to make 
nondiscrimination mandates difficult to implement. They are 
also likely to cause real-world prices to deviate from true 
nondiscriminatory prices. 
3. Demand-Side Price Discrimination. Like all products 
characterized by high fixed costs and lower marginal costs, 
services provided by network industries confront a 
fundamental pricing problem. Academic scholarship on 
networks and regulators has long recognized how price 
discriminatory regimes such as Ramsey pricing can alleviate 
these problems. 
The pricing problem is best understood in terms of the 
impact of high fixed cost on the relative position of the 
marginal cost and average cost curves.205 Usually fixed costs 
place consistent downward pressure on marginal cost as those 
upfront investments are amortized over increasingly large 
volumes. The impact of fixed costs on average costs decays 
exponentially to the point where further increases in 
production only cause small marginal reductions on average 
                                                     
 201. See VISCUSI, HARRINGTON & VERNON, supra note 20, at 168; YOO, supra note 13, 
at 43, 78–81; Yoo, supra note 186, at 233–34. 
 202. See Yoo, supra note 180, at 1884–85; Yoo, supra note 186, at 208–10. 
 203. See Sally Floyd & Van Jacobson, Random Early Detection Gateways for 
Congestion Avoidance, 1 IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING 397, 397–402, 
405 (1993) (discussing how the RED algorithm avoids synchronization to maintain an 
average queue size); Bob Braden et al., Recommendations on Queue Management and 
Congestion Avoidance in the Internet 3–4 (Internet Eng’g Task Force Network 
Working Grp., Request for Comments No. 2309, 1998), available at 
http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc2309.pdf. 
 204. Yoo, supra note 186, at 209. 
 205. Yoo, supra note 180, at 1901–02. 
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cost.206 At small volumes of production, the ability to realize scale 
economies causes variable cost initially to reinforce this downward 
pressure on marginal cost and average cost.207 Sources of scale 
economies are typically exhaustible, however.208 Moreover, as 
production volumes increase, the cheapest sources of raw materials 
will become exhausted, and producing firms will have to manage an 
increasing number of resources.209 At some point, the economies of 
scale become replaced by diseconomies of scale, at which point 
variable costs begin to place upward pressure on average cost.210 
Eventually, as the upward pressure on average cost associated with 
variable cost dominates the increasingly weak downward pressure 
associated with fixed cost, the marginal cost curve will cross the 
average cost curve, and the average cost curve will begin to rise 
(indicated in Figure 1 by Q*).211 The larger the fixed costs, the 
higher the quantity at which this crossover point will occur.212 
 
Figure 1: The Impact of Fixed Cost on the Relationship 
Between Marginal and Average Cost 
  
                                                     
 206. Id. 
 207. VISCUSI, HARRINGTON & VERNON, supra note 20, at 85–87. 
 208. Yoo, supra note 180, at 1901. 
 209. CHURCH & WARE, supra note 20, § 3.2, at 63–67, § 4.1.2, at 120–21, § 14.1.1, 
at 500–01; SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 168, at 103. 
 210. SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 168, at 104. 
 211. See id. at 102–06. 
 212. See id. at 98–100. 
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The maximization of economic welfare must satisfy two 
conditions. First, price must equal marginal cost, otherwise 
further increases in production would cause economic welfare 
to decrease.213 Second, price must equal or exceed average cost, 
otherwise the producing firms will go out of business, and the 
short-run equilibrium will not be stable in the long run.214 It is 
easy to identify prices that both equal marginal cost and equal 
or exceed average cost if industry demand is sufficiently large 
to permit multiple firms to produce volumes that exceed Q*. If, 
on the other hand, the total industry volume is less than Q*, 
no price-quantity pairs exist that both equal marginal cost and 
equal or exceed average cost. Any prices that equal average 
cost and thus permit the firm to break even necessarily exceed 
marginal cost and create some degree of deadweight loss. 
Monopolists seeking to maximize their profits will produce 
where marginal revenue equals marginal cost (represented in 
Figure 2 by Pmon and Qmon). At this point, prices are inefficiently 
high, in that they exceed marginal cost. The traditional policy 
response is to regulate rates to drive down the prices charged 
by the monopolist. To be sustainable, however, the price must 
permit the monopolist to cover its production costs, which 
requires that the prices equal or exceed average cost. Absent 
price discrimination, the lowest sustainable price that equals 
or exceeds average cost is represented in Figure 2 by Psus. The 
fact that Psus exceeds marginal cost means that it is inefficient 
and leads to a shortfall in production equal to the difference 
between Qsus and Qeff. The monopolist could serve consumers 
between Qsus and Qeff by charging them prices that fall below 
average cost and compensating by charging other customers 
prices that exceed average cost. In short, this is the only way 
both to maximize economic efficiency and to allow the 




                                                     
 213. See Yoo, supra note 180, at 1901. Indeed, the late Alfred Kahn called marginal 
cost pricing “[t]he central policy prescription of microeconomics.” 1 KAHN, supra note 20, 
at 65. 
 214. Yoo, supra note 180, at 1901. 
 215. Id. at 1901–02. 
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Figure 2: The Inevitability of Deadweight Loss in the 
Presence of Nondiscriminatory Pricing and High Fixed 
Cost216 
It is for this reason that economic textbooks regard price 
discrimination as a necessary condition to maximizing economic 
welfare in industries, like telecommunications, that require 
substantial fixed-cost investments.217 Indeed, this is the insight 
underlying Ramsey pricing, which allocates a higher proportion 
of the fixed costs to those consumers that are the least price 
sensitive (and thus will reduce their purchases only minimally 
even though prices exceed marginal cost) and a lower proportion 
of the fixed costs to those consumers who are the most price 
sensitive (and who will decrease their consumption sharply in 
response to any increase in price).218 
The FCC has been reluctant to permit Ramsey pricing in the 
context of unbundling out of concern that it would raise prices on 
those elements that are the most difficult to replicate, which it 
believed was inconsistent with the statute’s focus on promoting 
                                                     
 216. This Figure was adapted from Yoo, supra note 180, at 1902 fig.2. 
 217. See, e.g., CHURCH & WARE, supra note 20, § 25.2.1, at 795; JEAN-JACQUES 
LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS § 2.2.1.1, at 61–65 
(2000); SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 168, at 496–99; VISCUSI, HARRINGTON & VERNON, 
supra note 20, at 417–18. 
 218. Yoo, supra note 180, at 1902. 
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competition.219 One study estimated the welfare loss stemming 
from the refusal to implement Ramsey pricing for local telephone 
service at approximately $30 billion per year.220 
B. Determining When Rates Are Just and Reasonable 
Another aspect of common carriage is rate regulation, as 
demonstrated by the requirement that rates be just and 
reasonable. The Mann-Elkins Act of 1910 assigned responsibility 
for assessing rates to the Interstate Commerce Commission, which 
was focused primarily on the railroads and paid little attention to 
telephony.221 The Communications Act of 1934 transferred the 
authority to review rates to the newly created FCC, which promptly 
launched an investigation into AT&T’s rates.222 The FCC used 
studies by members of the Special Investigation staff regarding the 
Long Lines Department’s operations to obtain a $12 million 
reduction in long distance rates, announced on December 2, 1936.223 
The process used to set these rate reductions was surprisingly 
informal, consisting of informal negotiations with AT&T, which the 
FCC, in a self-congratulatory manner, lauded as avoiding the 
necessity of protracted rate proceedings and litigation.224 Indeed, 
this would represent the only formal investigation of AT&T’s rates 
for nearly three decades, as the FCC adopted a policy of “continuing 
surveillance,” during which rate adjustments were negotiated 
through informal discussions.225 Perhaps most shocking was the 
fact that these proceedings were immune from judicial review, 
as courts did not regard the public notices announcing the 
products of these negotiations to be agency action.226 
                                                     
 219. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996; Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio 
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 222. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE TELEPHONE RATE AND 
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854 (1938). 
 224. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 222, at 6–9. 
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This cozy world of collusive cooperation began to unravel 
when the federal government began to suspect that it was being 
overcharged.227 This led the FCC to launch its first cost study in 
nearly thirty years, which showed a wide disparity in the returns 
AT&T was earning on seven different classes of service.228 This 
led to a formal investigation of AT&T’s rates.229 More importantly 
for our purposes, it induced the FCC to adopt formal rate 
proceedings for the first time,230 albeit with some hesitation, 
which drew the ire of one of the sitting FCC Commissioners.231 
1. Rate-of-Return Regulation. As the Supreme Court has 
noted, determining whether a particular rate is reasonable is an 
“embarrassing question.”232 Justice Brandeis similarly called 
assessing the reasonableness of rates a “laborious and baffling 
task.”233 The most accurate basis for determining the 
reasonableness of a rate would be to compare it to the prices 
charged for comparable products bought and sold in an open 
market.234 The problem was that “utilities, unlike merchandise or 
land, are not commonly bought and sold in the market.”235 As a 
result, no such market benchmarks could exist. Another 
commonly used, market-based approach to valuation is 
calculating the net present value of the utility’s earning 
stream. Capitalizing earnings necessarily embroiled regulatory 
authorities in a “vicious circle,” since the rate would depend on 
the utility’s earnings, and the earnings were largely 
determined by the rates the utility was permitted to charge.236 
“The heart of the matter is that rates cannot be made to 
                                                     
 227. See GSA Requests Phone Rate Slash, 61 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 467, 467 (1958). 
 228. AT&T Co. and the Associated Bell System Companies Charges for 
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(1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
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 235. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 262 U.S. at 292. 
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depend upon ‘fair value’ when the value of the going enterprise 
depends on earnings under whatever rates may be 
anticipated.”237 
As a result, regulators must base their assessments on data 
other than market-based outcomes. To implement its new, more 
formal approach to evaluating the reasonableness of rates, the 
FCC naturally turned to the framework that state regulators had 
developed over the span of decades: rate-of-return regulation 
(also known as cost of service ratemaking).238 Rate-of-return 
regulation focuses on the cost of the inputs rather than the value 
of the outputs according to the following formula: 
 
R = O + Br, 
 
where R is the total revenue the carrier is permitted to generate 
(sometimes called the revenue requirement), O is the carrier’s 
operating expenses incurred during that particular rate year 
(such as taxes, wages, energy costs, and depreciation), B is the 
amount of capital investments that must be recovered over 
multiple rate years (also known as the “rate base”), and r is the 
appropriate rate of return allowed on the capital investment.239 
Once the total revenue requirement is set, prices are set for 
each service in a manner designed to allow the firm to satisfy 
that requirement. If there is only one product and one rate class, 
rates are then determined simply by dividing the total revenue 
requirement by the number of units consumers are expected to 
demand.240 If, as is usually the case, the regulated firm offers 
multiple products (e.g., local and long distance services) and 
more than one class of service (e.g., residential and business 
services), the calculus is considerably more complex.241 Regulators 
then monitor the overall revenue and profit earned by the 
regulated entity to make sure that unexpected variations do not 
cause major deviations from the targets. 
Rate-of-return regulation has been the subject of widespread 
criticism. For example, the National Telecommunications and 
                                                     
 237. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 601 (1944) (footnote 
omitted). 
 238. See Kathleen B. Levitz, Loosening the Ties That Bind: Regulating the 
Interexchange Services Market for the 1990’s, (FCC Office of Plans & Pol’y, Working 
Paper, Mar. 9, 1987), reprinted in 2 FCC Rcd. 1495, 1496, 1502 n.2 (1987). 
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 240. See CHURCH & WARE, supra note 20, § 26.2.1, at 842–46. 
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HARRINGTON & VERNON, supra note 20, at 443–45. 
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Information Administration states: “Almost from its inception, 
there has been criticism of this traditional, and predominant, 
communications regulatory tool. Since the early 1960s, a number 
of economists have identified and, in some cases, sought to 
quantify, the excessive costs attributable to rate of return 
regulation.”242 Crandall and Waverman similarly observe, “The 
disadvantages of [rate-of-return] regulation . . . have been well 
identified in the literature.”243 The FCC has been trying to 
develop alternative methodologies since the late 1970s.244 
More recently, regulators have begun to move away from 
formal tariffs for nondominant firms. For example, the FCC 
attempted to exempt MCI and Sprint from tariff filings because 
they lacked a dominant position.245 As AT&T lost its dominant 
position, the FCC eventually attempted to allow AT&T to comply 
only with the tariff procedures for nondominant carriers.246 The 
courts rejected the FCC’s actions, holding that the statute 
required the filing of tariffs and did not give the FCC the power 
to create exceptions.247 
Congress eventually amended the statute to give the FCC 
the discretion to forbear from enforcing the statutory tariff 
requirements whenever the agency finds that tariffs are not 
necessary to protect consumers or to ensure reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory rates and that forbearing would be in the 
public interest.248 The FCC has exercised its forbearance 
authority to completely detariff long-distance services rates.249 
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Corp. v. FCC, 43 F.3d 1515, 1517, 1526 (D.C. Cir. 1995); AT&T Co. v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727, 729 
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 248. 47 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2012). 
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After initially ruling to the contrary,250 the FCC has also ruled 
that local telephone companies do not have a dominant position 
in digital subscriber lines (DSL) and thus do no need to file 
tariffs for those services.251 Instead, carriers simply have to post 
their terms of service on their website.252 
a. Determining the Proper Rate Base. One of the most 
longstanding challenges is determining how to value capital 
expenses that comprise the rate base (B). Establishing the proper 
way to determine the value of the cost of the rate base has proven 
to be one of the most difficult problems in economic regulation.253 
Indeed, in Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, the Supreme 
Court characterized the word “cost” as “a chameleon,” “virtually 
meaningless,” and “protean.”254 
The biggest controversy has surrounded whether the rate 
base should be calculated based on historical cost or replacement 
cost.255 Munn v. Illinois originally eschewed any judicial 
involvement in evaluating the reasonableness of rates, insisting 
that that was the province of legislatures.256 The Supreme Court 
changed course in the landmark case of Smyth v. Ames, which 
held that the Constitution entitled regulated firms to rates based 
on the “fair value” of their assets.257 And by fair value, the Court 
meant the assets’ current market value as measured by 
replacement cost.258 
More recently, regulatory authorities have begun to turn an 
even more stringent form of replacement cost, exemplified by the 
FCC’s adoption of Total Element Long-Run Incremental Cost 
(TELRIC), used to implement rates set under the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.259 This calculation was based 
not on the replacement cost of the assets actually purchased, but 
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v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205, 208 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 252. Id. at 14901 ¶ 90. 
 253. See 1 KAHN, supra note 20, at 45–51. 
 254. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 500–01 (2002) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 255. See SPULBER & YOO, supra note 37, at 127–28. 
 256. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 133–34 (1876). 
 257. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546 (1898). 
 258. See Siegel, supra note 43, at 227–32. 
 259. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 491–97 & n.16; 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b) (2012); see also 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56. 
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rather on the replacement cost of the most efficient technology 
available at the time that rates were being set.260 In other words, 
TELRIC bases rates not on the replacement cost of the actual 
network, but rather on that of a hypothetical network based 
around the most efficient components if the network were rebuilt 
from scratch today.261 
The contrary position received its canonical statement in 
Justice Brandeis’s landmark concurrence in Missouri ex rel. 
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission.262 
Brandeis recognized that replacement cost might well represent 
the best evidence of present value, as it would reflect changes in 
demand and technology occurring after the assets were originally 
purchased.263 The problem was that determining replacement 
cost, however, was an inherently speculative endeavor fraught 
with uncertainty. Instead, Brandeis advocated relying on historic 
cost for the pragmatic reason that it was less subjective and less 
susceptible to manipulation.264 
Rather than resolve this controversy, the Supreme Court 
instead chose to abandon the enterprise of evaluating rates 
altogether. Beginning in Federal Power Commission v. Hope 
Natural Gas Co., the Supreme Court invoked notions of judicial 
deference and restraint to uphold any rate, whether based on 
historical or replacement cost, so long as it fell within a broad 
zone of reasonableness.265 
The problem is that the debate between historical and 
replacement cost is not merely academic. The choice between 
them can have dramatic implications for both the rates paid by 
consumers and the returns earned by companies. For example, 
when Smyth was decided, the country was in the midst of a 
depression, and in this deflationary environment, replacement 
costs meant lower rates, and historical cost meant higher rates.266 
In following years, replacement cost tended to cause rates to 
increase, particularly during World Wars I and II.267 Indeed, 
                                                     
 260. 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b)(1). 
 261. Although TELRIC requires determining replacement costs of the hypothetically 
most efficient assets, it does not require basing rates on the hypothetically most efficient 
locations. See id. In recognition that locations of central offices cannot easily be moved, it 
takes the locations of the existing wire centers as given. See id. 
 262. Missouri ex rel. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 276, 299–302 
(1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 263. Id. 
 264. See id. at 308–10; see also 1 KAHN, supra note 20, at 39 & nn.40–41. 
 265. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944). See 
generally SPULBER & YOO, supra note 37, at 128. 
 266. See 1 KAHN, supra note 20, at 39; Siegel, supra note 43, at 222–23. 
 267. See 1 KAHN, supra note 20, at 40; Siegel, supra note 43, at 233–34. 
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during times of inflation, replacement cost methodologies can 
provide regulated firms with a windfall. In addition, the 
uncertainty surrounding replacement cost determinations, and 
particularly those made around hypothetical combinations of 
assets, made rate hearings costly and maddeningly inconsistent 
in terms of results.268 As noted later, it can be particularly 
difficult to apply when technology is in a state of flux. 
The result is that, aside from TELRIC, regulatory 
authorities have ended their endless fights over how best to 
determine replacement cost and generally relied on more stable 
and less arbitrary measures of historical cost.269 Historical cost is 
not without its own drawbacks, however. Guaranteeing a return 
on outdated technology can reward obsolescence.270 As such, one 
of the most difficult administrative problems associated with 
common carriage regulation remains unresolved. 
b. The Lack of Incentive to Economize on Costs. A widely 
cited problem with rate-of-return regulation is that the regulated 
firm has no incentive to economize on costs. The cost-plus nature 
guarantees the firm a return on its expenditures, which dampens 
their incentive to economize as well as their incentive to invest in 
cost-reducing improvements.271 Firms subject to rate regulation 
may also avoid deploying new technologies that would render its 
investments in its rate base obsolete before they have the chance 
to recover those costs.272 
Conversely, regulated firms may overspend on quality to 
avoid interruptions that would weaken political support or 
undertake costs that would make management processes and 
labor relations easier.273 Regulators attempt to curb inappropriate 
                                                     
 268. Review of the Commission’s Rules Regarding the Pricing of Unbundled Network 
Elements and the Resale of Service by Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd. 18945, 18948–49 ¶¶ 6–7 (2003); see also Shelanski, 
supra note 98, at 79–80. 
 269. 1 KAHN, supra note 20, at 39, 41–42; see also CHURCH & WARE, supra note 20, 
§ 26.2.1, at 844. 
 270. SPULBER & YOO, supra note 37, at 225–26. 
 271. Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, Second Report and 
Order, 5 FCC Rcd. 6786, 6789 ¶ 22 (1990) [hereinafter LEC Price Cap Order], petition for 
review dismissed sub nom. Nat’l Rural Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 988 F.2d 174, 177 (D.C. Cir. 
1993); AT&T Price Cap Order, supra note 225, 2889–90 ¶¶ 29–30; CHURCH & WARE, 
supra note 20, § 26.2.2, at 847, § 26.2.3, at 852; CRANDALL & WAVERMAN, supra note 243, 
at 100; NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., supra note 19, at 27–29; 2 KAHN, supra note 
20, at 48; SPULBER & YOO, supra note 37, at 129; Haring & Kwerel, supra note 19, at 
1489. 
 272. NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., supra note 19, at 19–20, 27, 29; see CHURCH 
& WARE, supra note 20, § 26.2.3, at 848–49. 
 273. CHURCH & WARE, supra note 20, § 26.2.3, at 848–49, 852, 2 KAHN, supra note 
20, at 50, 53; NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., supra note 19, at 27. For a review of the 
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expenditures by only allowing carriers to recover investments 
that were “prudent,” usually determined by whether the asset for 
which recovery is sought is “used and useful.”274 Realistically, this 
authority enables regulators to catch only the most egregious of 
excesses.275 And in any event, it can never evaluate investments 
that were never made but should have been. 
Moreover, ex post evaluation always runs the risk of hindsight 
bias, denying recovery of investments and expenditures that were 
prudent at the time they were undertaken but ended up not 
panning out.276 The problem is that once investments are sunk, 
regulated firms are vulnerable to regulatory opportunism should 
regulators arbitrarily strand costs by finding them to be 
imprudent.277 The risk of such expropriation can cause firms to 
underinvest systematically in their networks.278 
A closer review of the literature reveals a number of subtleties. 
Consider the role of regulatory lag. The natural instinct is to regard 
it as a shortcoming because delays in updating rates can cause 
them to deviate from reasonable cost. During the period between 
rate hearings, however, prices no longer depend on costs.279 As a 
result, the regulated firm can keep any cost savings it is able to 
achieve, providing some limited incentive to economize.280 Of course, 
this incentive varies with the length of time remaining until the 
next rate hearing.281 As the rate hearing approaches, the incentive 
to keep costs down weakens.282 
In addition, the guarantee of a rate of return may create a 
moral-hazard problem that gives regulated firms excess 
                                                     
empirical literature, see Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose, The Effects of Economic 
Regulation, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1450, 1484–86 (Richard 
Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989). 
 274. See, e.g., JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, ALBERT L. DANIELSEN & DAVID R. KAMERSCHEN, 
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 257–58 (2d ed. 1988); SPULBER & YOO, supra note 
37, at 129. 
 275. See CHURCH & WARE, supra note 20, § 26.2.2, at 851–52; 2 KAHN, supra note 20, 
at 47; NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., supra note 19, at 27–28. 
 276. Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Toward a Unified Theory of Access to 
Local Telephone Networks, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 43, 84 (2008). 
 277. Yoo, supra note 166, at 294–95. 
 278. Thomas P. Lyon, Regulation with 20-20 Hindsight: “Heads I Win, Tails You 
Lose”?, 22 RAND J. ECON. 581, 581–82 (1991) (citing John Panzar). 
 279. See 2 KAHN, supra note 20, at 48 (discussing regulatory lag). 
 280. CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 20, at 669; 2 KAHN, supra note 20, at 48; 
VISCUSI, HARRINGTON & VERNON, supra note 20, at 432–33; see Paul L. Joskow, Inflation 
and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the Process of Public Utility Price 
Regulation, 17 J.L. & ECON. 291, 294 (1974). 
 281. See STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 48 (1982). 
 282. Id. 
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incentives to undertake risky projects.283 If so, reviewing 
expenditures for prudence may actually bring investment closer 
to optimal levels.284 Indeed, pre-committing a “used and useful” 
regime may benefit common carriers by preventing regulatory 
authorities from increasing the costs they declare to be 
imprudent.285 
c. Determining the Proper Rate of Return. Determining the 
appropriate rate of return often proves even more difficult than 
determining the appropriate rate base.286 The regulator must 
decide whether to focus on the regulated entity’s cost of capital or 
that of represented industry participants.287 The regulator must 
determine whether to evaluate the current risk level or the one 
at the time the capital expenditures were made.288 In determining 
the weighted average cost of capital, regulators must take into 
account the different tax treatment of each instrument.289 They 
must also decide whether the risk premium includes protection 
against inflation or reflects pioneering new services that are not 
yet proven.290 This determination is complicated by the fact that 
small differences in rates of return can have dramatic effects on 
the total revenue that the carrier is allowed to generate.291 
In the end, setting rates of return is as much about a 
political bargain allocating benefits between consumers and 
firms as it is about economics.292 It should thus come as no 
surprise that firms that practice in multiple jurisdictions often 
find wide variance in the rate of return they are permitted to 
earn.293 
d. Overcapitalization and the Averch-Johnson Effect. In 
addition to debates over how best to determine the rate base and 
the rate of return, debates over rate-of-return regulation have 
been dominated by concerns that the ratemaking formula may be 
                                                     
 283. See H. Stuart Burness, W. David Montgomery & James P. Quirk, Capital 
Contracting and the Regulated Firm, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 342, 349–50 (1980). 
 284. Lyon, supra note 278, at 582, 584, 586–88, 591. 
 285. See Richard J. Gilbert & David M. Newbery, The Dynamic Efficiency of 
Regulatory Constitutions, 25 RAND J. ECON. 538, 538–39, 547–48, 551 (1994) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 286. SPULBER & YOO, supra note 37, at 129. 
 287. 1 KAHN, supra note 20, at 45–46. 
 288. Id. at 46. 
 289. Id. at 50–51. 
 290. Id. at 51. 
 291. SPULBER & YOO, supra note 37, at 129. 
 292. CHURCH & WARE, supra note 20, § 26.2.1, at 844; 1 KAHN, supra note 20, at 42–
44. 
 293. NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., supra note 19, at 14. 
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creating systematic biases in firm behavior.294 The most famous 
such bias is the Averch-Johnson effect, which suggests that 
firms will favor capital-intensive solutions over solutions that 
emphasize operating costs, such as labor.295 This is because the 
ratemaking formula allows regulated firms to earn a rate of 
return on its capital expenses, whereas operating expenses are 
reimbursed dollar-for-dollar without any additional markup.296 
So long as the regulated rate of return exceeds the firm’s 
actual cost of capital, it should find it profitable to do so.297 
Stated slightly more formally, an unregulated firm would 
increase its use of both labor and capital until the marginal 
cost of each factor equals the marginal value that it 
generates.298 The constraint mentioned above that the 
regulated rate of return exceeds the actual cost of capital 
exaggerates the profit signal for capital, which means that the 
firm will increase its use of capital beyond the socially optimal 
point, at which point production no longer employs the socially 
optimal mix.299 
While conceptually appealing, the Averch-Johnson effect 
is subject to a number of caveats.300 As an initial matter, the 
effect may compensate for the fact that uncertainty dictates 
that some capital investments may not pan out.301 In addition, 
the effect does not occur if management seeks to maximize 
revenue instead of profits.302 
Moreover, a necessary condition for the effect to occur is 
that the regulated rate of return exceeds the firm’s cost of 
capital, otherwise all capital investments will be unprofitable, 
and the firm will exit the market.303 Consequently, the effect 
will not occur if inflation temporarily causes the firm’s cost of 
capital to rise above the regulated rate of return after the rate 
is set.304 In addition, any tendency toward overcapitalization 
                                                     
 294. SPULBER & YOO, supra note 37, at 129. 
 295. Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory 
Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052, 1068 (1962). 
 296. See id. at 1053–54. 
 297. See id. 
 298. Id. at 1055–56. 
 299. Id. at 1053, 1057. 
 300. See NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., supra note 19, at 25–26. 
 301. 2 KAHN, supra note 20, at 56–57. 
 302. Elizabeth E. Bailey & John C. Malone, Resource Allocation and the Regulated Firm, 
1 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 129, 137–38 (1970). 
 303. Averch & Johnson, supra note 295, at 1054–55. 
 304. Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint: A 
Reassessment, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 90, 90, 95 (1973); see also Paul L. Joskow & Richard 
Schmalensee, Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 7 & n.29 (1986) 
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may be offset if raising larger amounts of capital causes 
capital costs to rise.305 
Other factors may create downward pressure on capital 
costs. The extent to which regulators provide higher rates of 
return when rates are stable or declining may give firms the 
incentive to reduce costs.306 Moreover, during the lag when 
prices are fixed, firms can increase profits by cutting costs.307 
In addition, regulatory authorities may disallow certain 
capital expenditures as imprudent.308 
Another exception follows from Averch and Johnson’s 
second finding, which is typically overlooked in the literature. 
If the firm can use the same inputs to make a second product, 
it can also earn a rate of return that exceeds its cost of capital 
by entering that market as well.309 Indeed, it has the incentive 
to do so even if it runs a loss, so long as the difference between 
the regulated rate of return and the actual cost of capital 
exceeds the margin of the loss.310 To the extent that regulation 
is imperfect and regulated firms are still able to exercise 
monopoly power, the tendency to expand output and price 
below marginal cost may actually be beneficial.311 
Given this multitude of considerations, it comes as no 
surprise that empirical tests of the Averch-Johnson effect are 
all over the map.312 Some studies confirm a tendency toward 
overcapitalization.313 Others find undercapitalization314 or are 
inconclusive.315 
                                                     
(“Due to regulatory lag, the actual rates of return . . . may be above or below the commission-
determined fair rate of return at any instant.”). 
 305. 2 KAHN, supra note 20, at 57–58. 
 306. Id. at 57. 
 307. Joskow & Schmalensee, supra note 304, at 7–8.  
 308. VISCUSI, HARRINGTON & VERNON, supra note 20, at 462; Joskow & 
Schmalensee, supra note 304, at 8. 
 309. See Averch & Johnson, supra note 295, at 1058–59. 
 310. Id. at 1059. 
 311. 2 KAHN, supra note 20, at 106–07. 
 312. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 20, at 676; NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. 
ADMIN., supra note 19, at 26; Joskow & Rose, supra note 273, at 1477–79. 
 313. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 20, at 676; Leon Courville, Regulation and 
Efficiency in the Electric Utility Industry, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 53, 72 (1974); 
Jean Mirucki, A Study of the Averch-Johnson Hypothesis in the Telecommunications 
Industry, 12 ATLANTIC ECON. J. 121, 121 (1984); H.C. Petersen, An Empirical Test of 
Regulatory Effects, 6 BELL J. ECON. 111, 124 (1975); Robert M. Spann, Rate of Return 
Regulation and Efficiency in Production: An Empirical Test of the Averch-Johnson Thesis, 
5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 38, 50 (1974). 
 314. See David P. Baron & Robert A. Taggart, Jr., A Model of Regulation Under 
Uncertainty and a Test of Regulatory Bias, 8 BELL J. ECON. 151, 164–65 (1977). 
 315. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 20, at 676; Randy A. Nelson & Mark E. 
Wohar, Regulation, Scale Economies, and Productivity in Steam-Electric Generation, 24 
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Despite these caveats, the general consensus is that the 
Averch-Johnson effect does affect firm behavior, even if 
disagreement still exists as to its direction and magnitude.316 
Whatever the precise impact of the effect, it does underscore that 
introducing regulation would distort decisions away from those 
that marketplace participants would make in the absence of 
regulation. 
e. Setting Prices and Allocating Common Costs. The 
dynamism of Internet-related markets makes it more difficult to 
set prices in an efficient manner. As noted earlier, the most 
straightforward way to generate individual prices is to divide the 
revenue requirement by the projected demand.317 This yields a 
good result when industry demand and market shares are 
relatively stable. When demand is uncertain, however, prices 
may give the regulated firm a windfall if demand unexpectedly 
spikes, or it may fail to meet the revenue requirement if demand 
fails to meet expectations. 
Another classic problem associated with rate-of-return 
regulation is the reduction in pricing flexibility.318 As the user 
base becomes more heterogeneous, users will want an 
increasingly diverse range of increasingly customized products.319 
Some consumers may be willing to pay high prices for more 
features or higher quality. Others may wish to buy a no-frills 
version at a cheaper price. The creation of new products will 
inevitably require the regulatory approval of new price-product 
combinations. The inevitable lag means that regulation will 
cause the product offerings and prices to be increasingly out of 
step with consumer demand.320 The faster the rate of change, the 
more significant this wedge will become. 
Regulated pricing suffers from an even more fundamental 
problem. Because the approach to pricing described above simply 
divides total cost by total quantity,321 it represents a classic 
example of average cost pricing. As such, it deviates from the 
benchmark of marginal cost pricing that represents the central 
                                                     
INT’L ECON. REV. 57, 74–75 (1983); Charles W. Smithson, The Degree of Regulation and 
the Monopoly Firm: Further Empirical Evidence, 44 S. ECON. J. 568, 579 (1978). 
 316. 2 KAHN, supra note 20, at 50, 59; NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., supra note 
19, at 26. 
 317. See supra note 240 and accompanying text. 
 318. LEC Price Cap Order, supra note 271, at 6791 ¶ 35; NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. 
ADMIN., supra note 19, at 17. 
 319. YOO, supra note 13, at 16–18. 
 320. Yoo, supra note 95, at 52. 
 321. See supra text accompanying notes 240, 317. 
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policy prescription of microeconomics.322 Of course, when fixed 
costs are high, it is impossible to charge prices that both equal 
marginal cost and equal or exceed average cost.323 In that case, 
Ramsey pricing indicates that the most efficient outcome would 
be to charge in inverse proportion to the elasticity of demand.324 
Again, the average-cost approach to pricing embedded in rate-of-
return regulation is at odds with this outcome. 
The problem becomes much worse if the same assets are 
used to produce more than one service.325 When this occurs, basic 
principles of cost causality require that costs associated 
exclusively with one product be allocated to that product. All of 
the other costs are regarded as common costs.326 The question is 
by what metric those common costs should be allocated to 
individual products. 
The classic answer is to allocate them on the basis of some 
observable measure of utilization (such as minutes), revenue, or 
attributable cost assigned to each service.327 These are merely 
projections, and any deviation in fact can cause the firm to run a 
deficit. In addition, the choice among these measures is 
fundamentally arbitrary but has important consequences for the 
prices charged each class of customers.328 A more fundamental 
problem is that these measures are extremely unlikely to bear 
any resemblance to marginal cost.329 
Finally, the landmark article by Nobel Laureate George 
Stigler and Claire Friedland has launched an empirical literature 
assessing whether rate regulation actually lowers prices.330 
Although a burgeoning literature has emerged, it has not 
provided any simple policy inferences.331 
f. Variations in Product and Service Quality. As noted 
earlier, nondiscrimination mandates work best when the product 
                                                     
 322. See supra note 213 and accompanying text. 
 323. See supra Figure 2; supra text accompanying notes 215–218. 
 324. See supra text accompanying notes 215–218. 
 325. See LEC Price Cap Order, supra note 271, at 6789 ¶ 22; CRANDALL & 
WAVERMAN, supra note 243, at 109; NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., supra note 19, at 
13–14. 
 326. CHURCH & WARE, supra note 20, § 26.2.1, at 846; VISCUSI, HARRINGTON & 
VERNON, supra note 20, at 443. 
 327. CHURCH & WARE, supra note 20, § 26.2.1, at 846; 1 KAHN, supra note 20, at 151; 
VISCUSI, HARRINGTON & VERNON, supra note 20, at 443. 
 328. VISCUSI, HARRINGTON & VERNON, supra note 20, at 443–45. 
 329. 1 KAHN, supra note 20, at 151–52; VISCUSI HARRINGTON & VERNON, supra note 
20, at 444. 
 330. George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case 
of Electricity, 5 J.L. & ECON. 1, 4 (1962). 
 331. See Joskow & Rose, supra note 273, at 1464, 1473–74. 
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being regulated is a commodity and is created through a uniform 
production technology.332 When product quality and production 
costs vary, it can be very difficult to determine when price 
differentials are not justified by differences in cost. 
A similar effect arises with respect to rate regulation of 
monopolies. A regulated firm prevented by rate regulation from 
charging higher prices can still increase its profits simply by 
degrading quality.333 Indeed, empirical studies indicate that this 
is precisely what occurred in the cable television industry, when 
rate regulation actually caused quality-adjusted cable rates to 
rise.334 Conversely, if the rate-regulated firm is operating in a 
competitive (presumably oligopolistic) environment, the inability 
to compete on price may naturally lead it to compete based on 
quality.335 
The only alternative would be to regulate quality as well. 
The problem is that quality requirements would be notoriously 
hard to specify, let alone monitor and enforce, and even then they 
would have bite only when the party in question was blatantly 
deficient.336 
g. The Impact on Innovation. Firms subject to rate-of-
return regulation have often been criticized for their failure to 
innovate.337 As an initial matter, regulated firms may be 
reluctant to deploy innovations when doing so would obsolete 
existing equipment that has not been fully amortized. Moreover, 
the fact that its return is capped means that it benefits little 
from innovations that improve profitability.338 
Moreover, innovative activity typically carries greater risks 
than the firm’s existing lines of business, with the risk levels also 
varying from innovation to innovation. If the rate-of-return 
                                                     
 332. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 333. See David Besanko, Shabtai Donnenfeld & Lawrence J. White, Monopoly and 
Quality Distortion: Effects and Remedies, 102 Q.J. ECON. 743, 743–44, 756–57 (1987); 
David Besanko, Shabtai Donnenfeld & Lawrence J. White, The Multiproduct Firm, 
Quality Choice, and Regulation, 36 J. INDUS. ECON. 411, 418 (1988); Kenneth S. Corts, 
Regulation of a Multi-Product Monopolist: Effects on Pricing and Bundling, 43 J. INDUS. 
ECON. 377, 393–95 (1995). 
 334. See THOMAS W. HAZLETT & MATTHEW L. SPITZER, PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD 
CABLE TELEVISION: THE ECONOMIES OF RATE CONTROLS 61–63 (1997); Gregory S. 
Crawford, The Impact of the 1992 Cable Act on Household Demand and Welfare, 31 RAND 
J. ECON. 422, 444–45 (2000). 
 335. CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 20, at 677–78 & n.33; VISCUSI, HARRINGTON & 
VERNON, supra note 20, at 564–66. 
 336. 1 KAHN, supra note 20, at 22; VISCUSI, HARRINGTON & VERNON, supra note 20, 
at 361–62. 
 337. Haring & Kwerel, supra note 19, at 9. 
 338. NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., supra note 19, at 19. 
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formula applies a single, uniform rate of return, the regulated 
entity has little incentive to pursue ventures in which the risk 
exceeds the rate-of-return benchmark imposed by the authorities. 
Conversely, the possibility that an investment may be declared 
imprudent may deter regulated firms from pursuing innovations 
with higher risk.339 
Other commentators find some incentive to innovate in some 
areas.340 Some argue that rate regulation induces firms to pursue 
innovations that increase the productivity of labor over capital.341 
Others find the theory to be ambiguous.342 The empirical evidence is 
probably best characterized as thin and inconclusive.343 
h. Asymmetric Information. A related problem endemic to 
rate-of-return regulation is that all of the information needed to set 
rates is typically under the control of the firm being regulated.344 
Because the firm’s interests are not completely aligned with the 
regulator’s, this information asymmetry gives rise to a classic 
principal–agent problem in which the principal (the regulator) has 
limited ability to obtain and verify the relevant information as 
well as a limited number of inducements to alter the behavior 
of the agent (the regulated firm).345 
i. Compliance Costs. The final drawback of rate-of-return 
regulation is its costs. A 1987 NTIA study estimated compliance 
costs at $8 to $10 per line per year for an annual cost of 
$1.1 billion.346 In addition, a local telephone company reported that 
the state public utility commission took an average of 329 days to 
approve its tariffs, with a peak of 390 days. A major federal rate 
proceeding took three years.347 
2. Price Caps. The problems associated with rate-of-return 
regulation led regulatory authorities to experiment with an 
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Regulation for Induced Technical Change: Comment, 6 BELL J. ECON. 703, 703–05 (1975). 
 343. Joskow & Rose, supra note 273, at 1482–84. 
 344. CRANDALL & WAVERMAN, supra note 243, at 101; SPULBER & YOO, supra note 37; 
Shelanski, supra note 98, at 78. 
 345. CRANDALL & WAVERMAN, supra note 243, at 101; Shelanski, supra note 98, at 78. 
 346. NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., supra note 19, at 23–24. 
 347. Id. at 16. 
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alternative rate-setting regime known as “price caps.” 
Simultaneously developed in the early 1980s in the United 
Kingdom by government economist Stephen Littlechild348 and in the 
United States by AT&T researchers Peter Linhart, Roy Radner, and 
Frank Sinden,349 the scheme was deployed in the United Kingdom 
in 1984 and in the United States in 1989.350 By 2003, it had been 
adopted by 40 states before the onset of the trend towards 
deregulation.351 
The principles underlying price caps are relatively 
straightforward. The primary source of the disincentive to 
economize was the fact that prices were tied to costs, such that any 
increase in efficiency would lead directly to a reduction in 
revenue.352 Price caps are designed to make the prices a firm can 
charge independent of any reductions in cost.353 In addition, price 
caps were supposed to mitigate the principal–agent problem by 
shifting the focus to information that was more externally 
observable and verifiable and by giving the regulator the ability to 
offer the regulated firm higher-powered incentives.354 
The basic strategy was to regulate prices, not profits or 
revenues, and to do so based on information that was not firm-
specific. The formula for determining the change from maximum 
price allowed during the previous year is: 
 
P = CPI – X, 
 
where CPI is an adjustment for inflation based on the 
consumer price index and X is a factor set by the regulator to 
                                                     
 348. See STEPHEN C. LITTLECHILD, REGULATION OF BRITISH TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
PROFITABILITY ¶¶ 13.4, 13.6, 13.12, 13.16, at 1234–36 (1983) (detailing the “local tariff 
reduction scheme,” now known as price caps). 
 349. See Peter B. Linhart & Roy Radner, Deregulation of Long-Distance 
Telecommunications, in POLICY RESEARCH IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 102, 108–11 (Vincent 
Mosco ed., 1984); Peter B. Linhart, Roy Radner & Frank W. Sinden, A Sequential Mechanism 
for Direct Price Regulation, in PRICE CAPS AND INCENTIVE REGULATION IN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 130 (Michael A. Einhorn ed., 1991); see also P.B. Linhart, R. Radner & 
F.W. Sinden, A Sequential Principal-Agent Approach to Regulation (Bell Labs. Econ. 
Discussion Paper No. 264, 1983), available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/ 
~rradner/publishedpapers/53SequentialApproachRegulation.pdf. 
 350. AT&T Price Cap Order, supra note 225, at 2884 ¶ 18. 
 351. David E.M. Sappington & Dennis L. Weisman, Price Cap Regulation: What Have We 
Learned from 25 Years of Experience in the Telecommunications Industry?, 38 J. REG. ECON. 
227, 232 tbl.2, 233–34 (2010). 
 352. VISCUSI, HARRINGTON & VERNON, supra note 20, at 439. 
 353. Id.; Sappington & Weisman, supra note 351, at 230. 
 354. Mark A. Jamison, Regulation: Price Cap and Revenue Cap, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
ENERGY ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY 1245, 1246 (Barney L. Capehart ed., 2007). 
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reflect increases in productivity.355 The maximum price could 
also be adjusted to reflect other exogenous changes outside the 
control of the regulated firm.356 
The hope was that by basing adjustment to prices on an 
index of inflation as well as an estimate of improvements in 
industry productivity, price caps would lower the information 
required by agencies to regulate rates.357 Price caps also promised 
to eliminate many of the systematic biases inherent in rate-of-
return regulation. Because rates did not depend on costs, price 
caps would give regulated firms the incentive to economize on 
costs and would eliminate arguments over how to calculate the 
rate base and the proper rate of return.358 It would also eliminate 
the bias in favor of capital expenditures over operating 
expenditures identified by Averch and Johnson and would 
obviate the need to allocate common costs across products.359 
Moreover, because the regulated firm would retain the benefits of 
its efforts, it was hoped that price caps would make regulated 
firms more innovative.360 
Price caps can also promote pricing flexibility by allowing 
the maximum price to apply to a basket of goods rather than to 
individual products. Overall prices would comply with the price 
cap so long as the weighted average of the prices of those goods 
fell below the relevant threshold.361 This left regulated firms 
considerable latitude to vary the prices they charge for different 
goods as well as to engage in regimes such as Ramsey pricing.362 
Although price caps were once regarded as something of a 
panacea, later scholars suggested that the concept had been 
“oversold,”363 with each component posing its own challenges. 
Consider first the adjustment for inflation. The inflation index 
used to make this adjustment must be independent of the firm in 
order avoid problems of endogeneity.364 For example, under the 
FCC’s price cap scheme, the inflation index is measured by the 
                                                     
 355. Id. at 1246–48; Sappington & Weisman, supra note 351, at 229. 
 356. VISCUSI, HARRINGTON & VERNON, supra note 20, at 439–40; Sappington & 
Weisman, supra note 351, at 240–41. 
 357. CHURCH & WARE, supra note 20, § 26.2.3, at 854. 
 358. Id. § 26.2.3, at 853–54. 
 359. Ronald R. Braeutigam & John C. Panzar, Diversification Incentives under 
“Price-Based” and “Cost-Based” Regulation, 20 RAND J. ECON. 373, 375–77 (1989). 
 360. CHURCH & WARE, supra note 20, § 26.2.3, at 854. 
 361. Id. § 26.2.3, at 853. 
 362. Id. § 26.2.3, at 854. 
 363. Richard Schmalensee, Good Regulatory Regimes, 20 RAND J. ECON. 417, 434 
(1989). 
 364. See CHURCH & WARE, supra note 20, § 26.2.3, at 853. 
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Gross National Product Price Index.365 While the avoidance of 
endogeneity is critical, the fact that it does not represent 
inflation in any particular sector means that it will not reflect the 
true changes in any one industry. If so, the adjustments set may 
create either windfalls or shortfalls for regulated firms. The 
uncertainty surrounding the approximate index has deterred the 
adoption of price caps.366 Indeed, the errant index problem has 
been compared to Russian Roulette.367 
Uncertainty about costs also limits the benefits of price 
caps.368 If cost reductions are not observable by regulators, they 
may be forced to include a cushion in the price caps to make sure 
that regulated firms cover their costs.369 The larger the 
uncertainty, the larger this cushion must be.370 Driving prices 
further away from marginal cost maintains incentives for cost 
reduction (and thus productive efficiency) at the expense of 
allocative inefficiency.371 At certain levels of uncertainty, rate-of-
return regulation becomes preferable.372 Cost-based pricing will 
be more allocatively efficient, but at the cost of weaker incentives 
to maximize productive efficiency.373 
But the biggest challenge has been in determining how to set 
the X factor.374 Regulators and commentators have struggled with 
the proper way to calibrate the X factor.375 Those setting price 
caps must thread a needle. Setting the X factor too low will 
simply provide a windfall to network providers without yielding 
benefits to consumers. On the other hand, setting the X factor too 
high would deny providers a reasonable return and reduce 
incentives to invest.376 
Even more problematic is the extent to which price caps can 
also leave regulated firms vulnerable to regulatory opportunism. 
                                                     
 365. LEC Price Cap Order, supra note 271, at 6792 ¶ 50. 
 366. James M. MacDonald, John R. Norsworthy & Wei-Hua Fu, Incentive Regulation 
in Telecommunications: Why States Don’t Choose Price Caps, in INCENTIVE REGULATION 
FOR PUBLIC UTILITIES 27, 28 (Michael Crew ed., 1994). 
 367. JORDAN JAY HILLMAN & RONALD R. BRAEUTIGAM, PRICE LEVEL REGULATION FOR 
DIVERSIFIED PUBLIC UTILITIES: AN ASSESSMENT 69 (1989). 
 368. MacDonald, Norsworthy & Fu, supra note 366, at 38–39. 
 369. VISCUSI, HARRINGTON & VERNON, supra note 20, at 440. 
 370. Id. 
 371. Bailey & Malone, supra note 302, at 139–41. 
 372. NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., supra note 19, at 13–14. 
 373. Schmalensee, supra note 363, at 434. 
 374. VISCUSI, HARRINGTON & VERNON, supra note 20, at 440. 
 375. Jeffrey I. Bernstein & David E.M. Sappington, Setting the X Factor in Price-Cap 
Regulation Plans, 16 J. REG. ECON. 5, 6 (1999). 
 376. VISCUSI, HARRINGTON & VERNON, supra note 20, at 440; see also LEC Price Cap 
Order, supra note 271, at 6790 ¶¶ 30–32. 
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As noted earlier, the X factor has traditionally included an 
additional increase beyond actual productivity gains to ensure 
that consumers share in the benefits created by price caps.377 
Determining how much should be shared is essentially a political 
decision. As part of the determination of how large to set the 
sharing dividend, regulators may be tempted to examine profits. 
In the process, they would destroy the independence between 
prices and returns that makes the incentives to economize and 
innovate so high-powered.378 Unfortunately, regulatory 
authorities lack any way to credibly commit not to ratchet up the 
X factor in response to cost savings.379 
The British experience under price caps is instructive. After 
initially setting British Telecom’s X factor at 3% in 1984, the 
United Kingdom increased it to 4.5% in 1989, 6.25% in 1991, 
and 7.5% in 1993. This effect sharply dampens the incentive to 
economize on costs.380 The experience in the United States was 
similar, as the X factor grew from 3.3% in 1990381 to 4% in 
1995382 and 6.5% in 1997,383 with many of those adjustments 
applying retroactively. The D.C. Circuit rejected these efforts 
as arbitrary and capricious.384 
The empirical literature is divided on price caps’ effect on 
rates, with most studies finding that price caps lead to 
modestly lower prices385 and some studies concluding the 
opposite.386 Although early studies show that price caps led to 
the deployment of more modern equipment,387 other empirical 
                                                     
 377. CHURCH & WARE, supra note 20, § 26.2.3, at 853–54. 
 378. VISCUSI, HARRINGTON & VERNON, supra note 20, at 441–42. 
 379. CHURCH & WARE, supra note 20, § 26.2.4, at 858; VISCUSI, HARRINGTON & 
VERNON, supra note 20, at 441–42. 
 380. Jamison, supra note 354, at 1249–50. 
 381. LEC Price Cap Order, supra note 271, at 6787–88 ¶¶ 5–7, 6799 ¶ 100. 
 382. Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers, First Report and 
Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 8961, 9053–54 ¶ 209 (1995). 
 383. Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers, Fourth Report and 
Order in CC Docket No. 94-1 and Second Report and Order in CC Docket No. 96-262, 12 FCC 
Rcd. 16642, 16652 ¶ 18 (1997). 
 384. U.S. Tel. Ass’n v. FCC, 188 F.3d 521, 525–26 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 385. See, e.g., Robert Kaestner & Brenda Kahn, The Effects of Regulation and 
Competition on the Price of AT&T Intrastate Telephone Service, 2 J. REG. ECON. 363, 
370–72 (1990); Alan D. Mathios & Robert P. Rogers, The Impact of Alternative Forms 
of State Regulation of AT&T on Direct-Dial, Long-Distance Telephone Rates, 20 
RAND J. ECON. 437, 451–52 (1989). For a review of early surveys of the literature, 
see Sappington & Weisman, supra note 351, at 236–39. 
 386. See, e.g., Christopher R. Knittel, Regulatory Restructuring and Incumbent 
Price Dynamics: The Case of U.S. Local Telephone Markets, 86 REV. ECON. & STAT. 
614, 622 (2004). 
 387. See Sappington & Weisman, supra note 351, at 236–37. 
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studies find that price caps deter investment.388 The empirical 
evidence on quality is mixed, with some studies finding no 
deterioration of quality,389 others drawing the opposite 
conclusion,390 and still others finding mixed results,391 although 
these outcomes may have been the result of direct regulatory 
intervention.392 
3. Regulation of Nonprice Terms and Conditions. Common 
carriage mandates work best when the product is a commodity393 
and when the interface between products is relatively simple, 
easy to monitor, and requires little information from the 
network.394 Interconnection becomes considerably harder to police 
when the product varies in quality and the interface is complex. 
When that is the case, providers who are reluctant to provide 
service have access to a nearly endless source of nonprice ways in 
which they can defeat access.395 
As a result, disputes over reasonableness are likely to spill 
beyond price into other aspects of the business relationship. As a 
result, regulators will have to oversee a wide variety of nonprice 
terms.396 Indeed, the FCC’s experiences in implementing TELRIC 
and other access regimes are far from encouraging in this 
regard.397 These problems are likely to worsen as the end users, 
                                                     
 388. See, e.g., Jaison R. Abel, The Performance of the State Telecommunications 
Industry Under Price-Cap Regulation: An Assessment of the Empirical Evidence 
(Nat’l Regulatory Research Inst. Research Report No. 00-14, 2000), available at 
http://ipu.msu.edu/library/pdfs/nrri/Abel-State-Telecom-Price-Cap-Regulation-00-14-
Sept-00.pdf. 
 389. See, e.g., Aniruddha Bannerjee, Does Incentive Regulation “Cause” Degradation 
of Retail Telephone Service Quality?, 15 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 243, 263–65 (2003); Donald 
J. Kridel, David E.M. Sappington & Dennis L. Weisman, The Effects of Incentive 
Regulation in the Telecommunications Industry: A Survey, 9 J. REG. ECON. 269, 298–300 
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INCENTIVE REGULATION: A RESEARCH REPORT 87–88 (1989). 
 391. See generally Chunrong Ai, Salvador Martinez & David E. Sappington, Incentive 
Regulation and Telecommunications Service Quality, 26 J. REG. ECON. 263 (2004); Luis 
Otávio Façanha & Marcelo Resende, Price Cap Regulation, Incentives and Quality:  The 
Case of Brazilian Telecommunications, 92 INT’L J. PRODUCTION ECON. 133 (2004); Marcelo 
Resende & Luis Otávio Façanha, Price-Cap Regulation and Service-Quality in 
Telecommunications:  An Empirical Study, 17 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 1 (2005). 
 392. Sappington & Weisman, supra note 351, at 248–49. 
 393. See Yoo, supra note 95, at 40–41. 
 394. See Gerald R. Faulhaber, Policy-Induced Competition: The Telecommunications 
Experiments, 15 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 73, 76–86 (2003). 
 395. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398, 
414 (2004); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 394–96 (1999) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 396. Yoo, supra note 180, at 1896–97. 
 397. See Yoo, supra note 95, at 40–42. 
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applications, technologies, and business relationships associated 
with the Internet become increasingly diverse.398 
C. Enduring Structural Separation 
Structural separation also represents a significant source 
of welfare loss. Economists have long recognized that vertical 
integration can lower prices, particularly when both levels are 
highly concentrated.399 It can also promote productive efficiency 
by rationalizing production when inputs can be used in 
variable proportions.400 Vertical integration can also reduce 
transaction costs and help protect against opportunism.401 As 
noted earlier, it can also mitigate the systematic 
underproduction associated with positive spillovers by 
allowing the owner of the infrastructure to internalize a 
greater percentage the benefits that it creates.402 
A recent survey of the empirical literature indicates that, 
aside from a few isolated studies, the weight of the evidence 
indicates that “under most circumstances, profit-maximizing 
vertical-integration decisions are efficient, not just from firms’ 
but also from the consumers’ points of view,” a conclusion that 
the researchers did not have in mind when they began their 
review of the evidence and which they found somewhat 
surprising.403 Moreover, the survey found “clear evidence that 
restrictions on vertical integration that are imposed . . . on 
owners of retail networks are usually detrimental to 
consumers.”404 They thus called on “government agencies to 
reconsider the validity of such restrictions.”405 
The FCC’s prior experience with structural separation has 
not been sanguine. For example, the line-of-business 
restrictions imposed by the breakup of AT&T forced the court 
to consider hundreds of waiver requests.406 These requests 
                                                     
 398. See id. at 40. 
 399. See, e.g., Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. 
POL. ECON. 347, 352 (1950). 
 400. See, e.g., John M. Vernon & Daniel A. Graham, Profitability of 
Monopolization by Vertical Integration, 79 J. POL. ECON. 924, 924–25 (1971). 
 401. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND 
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 104, 124 (1975) (arguing that vertical integration 
economizes on transactions and suppresses opportunistic profit haggling). 
 402. See Yoo, supra note 166, at 193; see also supra note 60 and accompanying 
text. 
 403. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Vertical Integration and Firm 
Boundaries: The Evidence, 45 J. ECON. LIT. 629, 680 (2007). 
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 406. SPULBER & YOO, supra note 37, at 330. 
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could take over four years to process and were estimated to 
cost over one billion dollars.407 
The experience under the structural separation mandated by 
the Computer Inquiries was similar. The separate subsidiary 
requirements prevented phone companies from offering caller ID 
and other services. One econometric study estimated the welfare 
losses from the delayed introduction of these services exceeded 
one billion dollars each year.408 These costs led the FCC to abolish 
the structural separation requirement in favor of an accounting 
separation requirement.409 
The general theory and empirical evidence as well as the 
FCC’s experience all suggest that the structural separation 
imposes significant harms. That fact counsels extreme caution 
before embracing a regulatory regime that would mandate it. 
D. Facilitating Collusion 
Another drawback is that common carriage regulation has 
long been recognized to facilitate collusion.410 
1. Barriers to Entry. As an initial matter, common carriage 
typically imposes access controls. As noted earlier, federal law 
requires interstate carriers to obtain a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity before constructing or extending any 
new facilities.411 At best, the clearance process delays entry.412 At 
worst, it can block entry altogether, as evidenced by Congress’s 
enactment of a provision prohibiting states from using the 
certificate process from forestalling the emergence of 
competition.413 
In addition, firms may use common carriage regulation as an 
entry barrier. It has long been recognized that industry-wide 
                                                     
 407. See Paul H. Rubin & Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Costs of Delay and Rent-Seeking 
Under the Modification of Final Judgment, 16 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 385, 385–
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 408. Jerry A. Hausman, Valuing the Effect of Regulation on New Services in 
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84 F.C.C.2d 445, 455 ¶ 30 (1981) [hereinafter Competitive Carrier Further NPRM]. 
 413. See 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2012). 
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regulation can benefit incumbents despite the additional costs of 
compliance if new entrants and fringe players will find it harder 
to bear the regulatory burden.414 Indeed, there are examples 
where firms have actively sought regulation in order to create 
entry barriers.415 
2. Standardization of Products and Pricing. Cartels are 
much easier to form and enforce when products are 
homogeneous. When products are uniform, any coordination 
designed to reduce competition need only focus on a single 
dimension: price.416 When products are heterogeneous, however, 
any price agreement must take into account all of the ways that 
products can vary. This makes agreements both harder to reach 
and to police.417 Indeed, if products are so customized that each is 
individualized, cartel cheating may be almost impossible to 
detect or prevent.418 Another practice that tends to undermine 
oligopoly discipline is unsystematic price discrimination.419 
Indeed, secret price discrimination is one of the best ways for 
cartel members to cheat.420 Cartels also function best when 
demand is more or less constant, which in turn helps ensure that 
prices remain stable.421 
Common carriage has the effect of facilitating collusion along 
each of these dimensions. In short, standardizing both products 
and prices makes cartel agreements easier to reach and any 
defection from the cartel cheating easier to identify.422 Moreover, 
by preventing competitors from deviating pricing either up or 
down, common carriage can use the government to serve as an 
effective cartel enforcer. At the same time, entry restrictions and 
the ratemaking process can help stabilize demand. 
3. Pooling of Information and Advance Notice of Product 
Changes. Common carriage has the effect of making all pricing 
                                                     
 414. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 276–
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information visible and easily available to all other industry 
participants. In addition, it requires every provider to announce 
to all of its competitors any planned changes in prices or product 
offerings long in advance. The loss of lead time dampens the 
incentive to make price cuts.423 
Pooling of pricing information has long been recognized as a 
facilitating practice that makes it easier to form and maintain a 
cartel.424 As the FCC recognized: 
Tariff posting also provides an excellent mechanism for 
inducing noncompetitive pricing. Since all price reductions 
are public, they can be quickly matched by competitors. 
This reduces the incentive to engage in price cutting. In 
these circumstances firms may be able to charge prices 
higher than could be sustained in an unregulated market. 
Thus, regulated competition all too often becomes cartel 
management.425 
Such information is particularly helpful to cartels if that 
information pertains to changes in product or changes to price.426 
4. Ability to Use the Government to Enforce Cartel 
Pricing. Finally, cartels need some means to enforce the cartel by 
preventing price cutting. Cartels often find them difficult to 
enforce, as any mechanism must not reveal to the government 
they are colluding. 
Common carriage provides for an open and legal way to 
enforce prices. By requiring that prices conform exactly to the 
published rate, common carriage prohibits any deviations from 
the established price. Under the filed rate doctrine, regulated 
entities cannot cut their prices. Moreover, to the extent that 
these are enshrined in regulation, any compliance with these 
prices is immune from antitrust scrutiny.427 
In addition, common carriage gives any member of the public 
the right to challenge any proposed change to a tariff.428 Firms 
have routinely used this authority to oppose price reductions 
proposed by their competitors.429 As such, tariffing creates the 
same opportunity for interference as competitor suits in antitrust 
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law, where a less efficient competitor can try to prevent its rival 
from competing on the merits. 
*  *  * 
The imposition of common carriage thus facilitates collusion 
in a wide variety of ways. The danger of expediting the formation 
and maintenance of a cartel provides another important reason 
to resist common carriage. 
E. The Displacement of Business Judgment 
A final criticism is that rate-of-return regulation necessarily 
means “substituting the judgments of lawyers for those of 
business persons and engineers.”430 This inevitably means that 
decisions will be made in no small part on political 
considerations.431 Decisions about production, investment, and 
pricing are more properly made by people with industry-specific 
expertise and who are ultimately accountable to their 
shareholders for the performance of their business. 
IV. LESSONS FROM HISTORY 
Two historical examples provide apt illustrations of the 
potential downsides of common carriage regulation. 
A. Competitive Access Providers 
Long before the enactment of the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996, competition began to emerge in local telephone 
service. The arrival of fiber optics fostered the emergence of a 
new type of company known as competitive access providers 
(CAPs).432 CAPs initially focused on offering long distance 
bypass services, which allowed corporate customers to place 
long distance telephone calls without having to access the Bell 
System’s local telephone facilities. The eventual expansion of 
CAP networks to cover the entire core business districts of 
major metropolitan areas made it possible for CAPs to begin to 
offer local telephone service in direct competition with the 
incumbents.433 
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CAP-provided services possessed many advantages over 
those provided by the incumbent local telephone companies. 
First, CAP networks tended to employ more modern technology, 
which allowed them to offer a greater range of features and a 
more attractive price structure than could the incumbent local 
telephone companies.434 Unlike the incumbents, moreover, CAPs 
were not required to provide uniform services according to 
published tariffs approved by the FCC. As a result, they were 
able to respond more quickly to market demands and to tailor 
pricing and terms of service to each customer’s needs.435 Lastly, 
the untariffed nature of CAP services also allowed them to avoid 
the cross subsidies embedded in the system of access charges 
created by the FCC.436 
B.  Detariffing Business Services 
The emergence of competition in portions of the 
telecommunications industry has provided some impetus towards 
eliminating tariffing requirements. The FCC’s attempts to 
detariff long distance are described above. State public utility 
commissions have also been detariffing business services to 
permit providers to tailor their offerings to individual customers’ 
needs. Individual businesses have begun to demand increasingly 
specialized services. As a result, state public utility commissions 
have had to entertain a growing tide of petitions seeking 
permission to deviate from the published tariffs.437 
A similar move is taking place in local residential service, as 
competition from wireless services is leading local phone 
companies to request detariffing of rates. For example, Qwest 
asked the Idaho Public Utility Commission to deregulate its rates 
in light of the emergence of effective competition.438 The Idaho 
Public Utility Commission rejected the petition because it was 
not persuaded by the evidence that mobile telephony has become 
the functional equivalent of traditional wireline telephony.439 
                                                     
 434. Specifically, use of fiber optics provided dramatic improvements in the amount 
of available bandwidth. Id. It also decreased service costs in general and made them much 
less distance sensitive. Fiber optics also allowed CAPs to take advantage of the 
efficiencies made possible by computer processing, such as improved switching and digital 
compression. Id. 
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Over time, state public utility commissions have largely 
deregulated local phone service for businesses and have begun to 
deregulate residential local phone services as well.440 
C. VoIP 
The final case is interconnected VoIP. When VoIP was first 
introduced, it was largely exempt from all of the obligations 
imposed on local telephone service. Over time this has begun to 
change. Beginning in 2005, VoIP has become subject to universal 
service, e911, disability access, number portability, and service 
outage reporting requirements.441 
What is interesting is the extent to which VoIP is different 
from conventional telephony. Unlike traditional telephone 
service, VoIP rides on a packet network that only transmits data 
on a best efforts basis. As a result, it is much less reliable than 
conventional telephony.442 Because it rides on a general instead of 
a specialized network, it also consumes more bandwidth. 
At the same time, it is different from other types of Internet 
applications. The Internet was originally designed around one 
protocol called the Transmission Control Program.443 This 
protocol ensured reliability by requiring that every receiving host 
send an acknowledgement to the sending host for every packet it 
received.444 If the sending host did not receive a packet within the 
expected time frame, it would simply resend it.445 This approach 
presumed that reliability was more important than expediency 
and that if a packet was dropped, the next available window was 
best used for resending a dropped packet instead of sending a 
new one.446 
While this approach worked well for applications that were 
not particularly sensitive to delays of a fraction of a second, such 
as e-mail and web browsing, the Internet’s protocol designers 
soon discovered that this design did not work well for packet 
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voice.447 The delays waiting for the retransmission timer to expire 
and for the packet to be resent rendered the service unusable. 
Like all real-time applications, packet voice is also more sensitive 
to jitter. As a result, the protocol architects created a new 
protocol called the User Data Protocol (UDP) that would send 
packets without waiting for acknowledgements.448 
VoIP thus differs in important ways from both conventional 
telephony and traditional Internet applications, such as e-mail 
and web browsing. Specifically, it needs different services from 
and imposes different burdens on the networks on which it 
rides.449 Common carriage runs the risk of lumping it together 
with applications that are quite different. Doing so would 
potentially harm VoIP, although as it turns out, the increases in 
bandwidth now allow VoIP to run fairly well on the best-efforts 
Internet on most occasions.450 As a result, I would resist ARCEP’s 
call for Skype to register as a conventional telephone company, 
as well as the proposal before the ITU to bring Internet 
interconnection into the system used to settle international 
telephone calls. Even more importantly, homogenizing the 
networks’ services may threaten future applications that may 
place demands on the network that are different still. 
V. CONCLUSION 
With increasing frequency, common carriage is being 
invoked as a potential basis for regulating Internet-based 
services. The tone of these invocations often suggests that this 
recommendation simply represents a return to well established 
and uncontroversial principles. 
Anyone calling for the return of common carriage should 
grapple with the reality that common carriage has been the 
subject of extensive criticism for the past half century. The 
existence of controversy does not by itself prove that imposing 
common carriage would necessarily be bad policy. It does suggest 
that proponents of common carriage actively engage with the 
institution’s recognized shortcomings. Such a large corpus of 
scholarship simply cannot be ignored. 
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